Cornell Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 5 June 1983

Article 1

An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual
Relations
Robert A. Hillman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 617 (1983)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol68/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CESSATION OF

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Robert A. Hillmant
A party seeking cessation of contractual relations may introduce

many justifications for its actions. The party may claim that its contracting counterpart materially breached the contract or failed to perform an express condition precedent. Absent a breach, the party seeking

to end the contract may assert that the right to terminate was expressly
or implicitly reserved in the agreement.' Alternatively, the party may
claim that a mistake or an unanticipated circumstance excuses its obli-

gation to perform.
In such situations, the interests of the contracting parties in the enforcement of the contract often diverge. The nonceasing party may have
relied materially on the expectation of contract performance, or even in
the absence of reliance, may have anticipated substantial gains from
performance. On the other hand, performance of the contract may

cause the ceasing party severe economic harm. Courts must harmonize
these conflicting interests in determining whether to enforce the contract
by finding the party ceasing performance liable for damages or to permit cessation of performance by upholding the claim of breach, termi2
nation or excuse.
This article is a study of contract law's response to the problem of
cessation. 3 I have two primary goals. My first goal is to demonstrate
that the courts generally have taken a common approach to the issue of
cessation. 4 Although the cessation issue arises in many settings and has
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1969, University of Rochester; J.D. 1972,
Cornell Law School.
I wish to thank Ron Allen, Ted Eisenberg, Harvey Perlman, and Robert Summers for
their helpful suggestions.
1 Cf.U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (1977) (" 'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its
breach."); id § 2-106(4) (distinguishing "cancellation" from "termination").
2 For a discussion of the appropriate remedy for unwarranted cessation, see infra notes
141-51 and accompanying text. For specific discussions concerning remedies for the various
types of cessation, see infra Part II. See generaly Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 383 n.111 (1936) (courts determining whether termination
constitutes breach are influenced by "whether the plaintiff had changed his position in reliance on the contract").
3 Many of the same considerations in determining the right of cessation after contract
formation also apply to the revocation of offers before a contract is technically formed. This
article focuses entirely on the former problem.
4 See infa Part II.
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generated various constructs, such as material breach, good faith termination, material mistake, frustration, and impracticability, such constructs are misleading to the extent that they suggest that fundamentally
different considerations govern their adjudication.
My second goal is to explain the common approach to cessation.
Contract law's response to the problem requires an initial determination
of whether the parties have expressly assigned the right of cessation by
including an express condition, termination clause, or excuse clause in
their contract. Our legal system generally will enforce the parties' express agreement concerning cessation of performance because it respects
the rights of individuals to order their own affairs, 5 provided that they
do so with free and knowing assent.
Even assuming, however, that issues of assent are absent, the problem of cessation is more complex than simply referring to the contract
and enforcing the express agreement. First, although the parties are
generally free to make their own agreements, individual liberty is circumscribed by society's countervailing interest in protecting individuals
from harm and avoiding agreements that "shock the conscience." 6 In
extreme situations, then, contract law will nullify the parties' express
approach to cessation. 7 Second, cessation analysis is also more complex
than merely enforcing the parties' express agreement because the parties
often fail to allocate contract risks and entitlements clearly." In such
situations, courts must attempt to ascertain the parties' intentions concerning cessation. If the parties had no intentions, or their intentions
are not cognizable, courts must determine the right of cessation for
them. The weaker the evidence of intent concerning cessation, the
greater the likelihood that courts will discount such intentions. 9 When
the courts heavily discount the parties' intentions, or when the evidence
clearly indicates that the parties failed to reach an agreement concerning cessation, courts primarily attempt to do what is fair under the
circumstances.
Determining the right of cessation in cases that involve express cessation clauses and in cases where the parties' approach is unclear, thus
requires further investigation into *themeaning of fairness in the cessation context. 10 Four interrelated fairness norms figure prominently in
5 See generally C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE chs. 1-2 (1981).
6 See Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: .4 New Frameworkfor U.C.
Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25-26, 31-32 (1981).
7 See infra notes 25-39, 199-207 and accompanying text.
8 See infta notes 40-41, 65-69 and accompanying text.
9 Professor Fried observes that "as we move further from actual intention the standard
of presumed intention tends to merge into the other substantive standards used to solve the
problems caused by a failure in the agreement." C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 61.
10 Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 584 (1933) ("Just as the process of
interpreting a statute is really a process of subsidiary legislation, so is the interpretation of a
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such analysis. A first norm dictates that courts should favor the party
with greater equities.'I Courts effectuate this comparative equities norm
by balancing one party's reliance interest and potential gains from performance with the prospect of economic harm to the other party from
performance.
A second fairness norm dictates that a party should not knowingly
cause harm to another without justification.1 2 This harm-avoidance
norm insulates a contracting party from severe economic loss resulting
either from the other party's attempted cessation or enforcement of the
3
contract in the absence of countervailing harm to that other party.1
A third fairness norm is that a party must act reasonably to avoid
harming itself. The reasonableness inquiry requires a comparison of a
party's conduct to that of similarly situated parties or general community standards. If a party's conduct was unreasonable, the harm the
party suffered by reason of cessation or performance is not caused by the
other party and therefore the courts will discount it in the balancing
process. 14

A final fairness norm is that each party should benefit from an
agreement roughly according to the contract allocation.'

5

Courts

demonstrate the significance of this reciprocity norm when they consider
expected benefits, as well as prospective harm,' 6 in balancing interests
even when the parties' rights are uncertain because of an unclear cessation approach or because of a gap in the agreement.
Although decisions concerning cessation sometimes discuss other social policy related reasons, such as the avoidance of economic waste and
the encouragement of contract formation, a survey of opinions involving
the various types of cessation suggests that, besides freedom of contract,
7
fairness reasons typically represent the primary or only justification.'
contract really a method of supplementing the original agreement by such provisions as are
necessary to determine the point at issue.").
II See in/ra notes .80-105 and accompanying text.
12 See Summers, Rightness Reasons in the Law of Contracts 5, 11 (1981) (unpublished
essay on file with author); infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.'
13 See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
15 See in/a notes 135-40 and accompanying text. See generally Farnsworth, Disputes Over
Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. Rsv. 860, 878 (1968) (courts interpret contracts using
"premise. . . that fairness includes substantial equivalence in commercial exchanges"); Speidel, Court-ImposedPriceAdjustments UnderLong- Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 369, 405
(1981) ("ITihe advantaged party should share through compromise the unbargained for gains
and losses caused by unanticipated change. . . . [When unanticipated change imperils the
long-term supply contract, the advantaged party should make every reasonable effort to preserve and adjust the relationship and to harmonize conflict."); Summers, supra note 12, at 8
(numerous contract doctrines assure probability that both parties will receive their bargainedfor benefits under their agreement.).
16 Se in/ra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
note 154 and accompanying text. See generaly in/ra Part II and cases cited
17 See infra
therein.
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The courts' use of these fairness reasons demonstrates significant judicial
flexibility in resolving cessation disputes, and shows that obligations
arising from contractual relations are not only the product of the parties' promises, but are to a significant extent the product of interests
18
independent of those promises.
In Part I of this article I discuss the principles and norms of contract cessation. I begin with an analysis of the principle of freedom of
contract and its limitations in analyzing cessation problems and then
present the fairness norms that supplement freedom of contract. 19 In
Part II, I examine the various contexts in which the cessation issue may
arise. In the conclusion, I present some brief observations based on the
survey in Part II.
I
THE PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF CONTRACT CESSATION

A.

Freedom of Contract and Its Limitations
1. Express Allocation

To the extent that the parties have clearly assigned the right of
cessation, courts generally will enforce the agreement. 20 For example,
terminations based on a franchisee's failure to satisfy an expressly stated
minimum sales volume,2 ' on a seller's failure to deliver conforming
goods when the buyer's performance is expressly made conditional on
perfect tender, 22 or on the occurrence of an event included in a force
majeure clause, 23 are generally enforced on the grounds of freedom of
contract. This principle holds that freedom of private parties to order
24
their own affairs maximizes their welfare, and that of society.
18
19

See infira
notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
Part I also discusses social policy reasons for cessation decisions. See infra notes 152-64

and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 61 (W.D. Pa.
1980).
21 See Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967
DUKE L.J. 465, 474 (citing Union Tank Car Co. v. Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257 F. Supp.
510 (D. Neb. 1966), aff'dsub nom., Heator Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477
(8th Cir. 1967)).
22
Although U.C.C. § 2-601 sets forth a perfect tender rule, the significance of the rule is
diminished by other sections. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-205, 2-508 (1977).
23 For example, a revolution, war, strike, flood, fire, or other act of God.
24 Professor Speidel, referring to long-term supply contracts, notes that enforcement of
the parties' allocation of risks is efficient: "To use the jargon, allocative efficiency is predicted
to occur where the seller through consent has been compensated ex ante for assuming a risk
which, unfortunately for the seller, materializes as an ex post loss." Speidel, supra note 15, at
382 n.60; see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTs 21 (1982); see also C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 2
(freedom of contract is important example of freedom to dispose of "our rights . . .in our
persons, in our labor, and in some definite portion of the world. . . on terms that seem best
to us."). Cohen, supra note 10, at 575 ("[T]he law of contracts gives expression to and protects
the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect.').
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Courts have tempered freedom of contract, however, by subjecting
express right-of-cessation provisions to the tests of unconscionability and
related doctrines. 2 5 Unconscionability encompasses traditional bargaining process doctrines such as fraud, duress, and the duty to disclose, all
of which test the assent of the weaker party. 26 An express provision regarding cessation may be unenforceable, therefore, if procurred through
bargaining misconduct. 27 In addition, unconscionability applies to cases
in which assent is tainted, not by bargaining misconduct, but by the
unequal position of the parties. 28 An uneducated consumer who is unable to gain sufficient market information because of lack of resources,
for example, may be entitled to a finding of unconscionability when the
contract terms are harsh 29 and when the party accused of unconsciona30
bility can establish no economic justification for the harmful terms.
Small merchants may also be entitled to a finding of unconscionability.
For example, a franchisee may avoid a harsh termination clause 3 if the
32
franchisee suffered due to gross inequality of bargaining power.
25
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
Related doctrines include forfeiture, good faith, and public policy.
26 Section 2-302, comment 1, of the U.C.C. indicates that if enforcement of the contract
or term would result in "oppression and unfair surprise" it is unconscionable. Oppression
could refer to either the bargaining tactics of the party accused of unconscionability or the
resulting terms. Leff, Unonscionabii!y and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 499 (1967). Similarly, unfair surprise could involve tactics or surprise terms. Id at
499-500. Today, as a result of scholarly analysis followed by the courts, the paradigm case for
a finding of unconscionability involves both unfair bargaining tactics ("procedural unconscionability") and unfair terms ("substantive unconscionability'). See id
One propounded strength of unconscionability today is that it enables judges to police
agreements without the need to manipulate existing common law and equitable doctrines. See
Hillman, supra note 6, at 2, 16. Despite the common assertion that unconscionability is necessary to avoid manipulation, courts apply unconscionability in many situations in which they
could apply existing or developing common law assent doctrines without manipulation. Id
at 15-24. In fact, courts could apply these doctrines to virtually all bargaining misconduct
situations and thereby contribute to the clarity of the unconscionability inquiry. See Hillman,
supra note 6. The assent doctrines indicate more precisely than procedural unconscionability
the factual elements that compel finding a contract or term unenforceable. Id at 21. In
addition, the doctrines indicate when both the bargaining process and the resulting terms are
significant and when the bargaining process alone compels a finding of unenforceability. Id
at 21-22; see also Eisenberg, The Bargain PrincibleandIts Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 752-54
(1982) (describing new paradigm of unconscionability authorizing review of fairness of contract terms in addition to review of bargaining process).
27 See, e.g., Ashland Oil Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1976).
28 Hillman, supra note 6, at 30-3 1.
29 Id at 31.
30 Id at 33.
31
For some examples of harsh termination clauses see Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 514-15.
32
A franchisor often has a "substantial" bargaining power advantage over the franchisee. Id at 468; see also Comment, "At Will" Franchise Termination and the Abuse of Rights
Doctrine: The Maturation of Louisiana Law, 42 LA. L. REv. 210, 213 (1981). The Comment
aptly describes the host of inequalities that the weaker franchisee may suffer. But see Jordan,
Unconscionabilily at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REv. 813, 856 (1978) (franchisees may enjoy
"considerable bargaining power in their own right").
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Even absent unequal bargaining position or bargaining misconduct, courts occasionally strike down terms of agreements that "shock
the conscience."'33 Although courts are reluctant to overturn express
contract provisions in the absence of assent problems, they have intervened on unconscionability and related grounds to ensure some degree
of balance in the fruits of the exchange, 34 especially when the party that
proposed the suspect term cannot 'establish any commercial justification
35
for it.
Such judicial intervention is prevalent, for example, in cases
involving the cessation of performance by a party after the other fails to
satisfy an express contractual condition. 36 An express provision permitting termination unless "every brick is in place" in a construction contract, for example, may be unenforceable on a host of grounds including
unconscionability and forfeiture. 3 7 Similarly, courts may bar a
franchisor from exercising an onerous termination clause, such as one
that permits termination for any reason on short notice. 38 The good
faith requirement also constrains the use of suspect clauses. For example, courts may find bad faith where a party that is unharmed by the
breach of an express clause uses the breach as a pretext for ceasing performance and entering into a more attractive alternate deal. Courts
may grant damages to the other party in such a situation even though
that other party's breach technically triggers the bontract's right of
39
cancellation.

33 Hillman, supra note 6, at 26-27.
34 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (contract "too
hard a bargain and too one-sided" to enforce).
35 See, e.g., Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss.
1979); see also Hillman, supra note 6, at 33-34 (arguing that courts should evaluate contract
terms in context of commercial setting in which they were made).
36 See, e.g., Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977); Holiday Inns of
Am., Inc. v. Knight, 70 Cal. 2d 327, 450 P.2d 42 (1969).
37 See, e.g., 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 720 (1963) (time of the essence
provisions in building contract); see also Baker v. Ratzlaff, I Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153
(1977) (clause requiring buyer's immediate payment on delivery without notice of request
would be unconscionable).
38 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Ch. Div.
1972), afed, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cer. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
39 See Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977); see also Speidel, supra
note 15, at 411 n.176 ("A classic example of bad faith is where a buyer rejects a not quite
perfect tender by a seller because he is disenchanted with the overall bargain rather than
dissatisfied with the seller's performance."); Summers, "Good Faith" in GeneralContract Law and
the Sales Provisionsof the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 249-50 (1968) (rejection
of goods ostensibly for nonperfect tender, but in reality to take advantage of market conditions is "bad faith" rejection).
Insistence on the performance of onerous express provisions of contracts has been recognized as bad faith in cases involving the U.S. government's treaties with Native Americans.
See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (involving United States government's
treaties with Cherokee Indians).
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2. Implied Allocation
Instead of exhibiting clarity, the parties' cessation approach may be
obfuscated for many reasons. The drafters may have been incompetent
or in a hurry or may have minimized the problem. Or they may have
chosen to draft generally to avoid bickering or even to avoid losing the
deal.4° The drafters also may have employed words that are too
41
elastic.
When a cessation right is not clearly expressed for any of these (or
other) reasons, courts typically examine contractual language and surrounding circumstances in an effort to ascertain the intention of the parties. In some cases this evidence is sufficiently strong for a court to
conclude that the parties actually intended a particular cessation approach.42 For example, contractual language, course of dealing, or usage of trade may individually or in combination demonstrate that the
parties contemplated a certain minimum standard of performance as a
condition precedent to the other party's obligation to perform, even
when the contract does not expressly indicate the standard of performance.4 3 Similarly, when a contract is silent as to duration, such evidence
44
may demonstrate that the parties contemplated a reasonable duration.
Courts will generally enforce such implied-in-fact agreements on cessation subject to the same constraints that are involved in enforcing express terms.
In other cases, the evidence derived from contractual language or
surrounding circumstances, although less substantial, may still suggest
the probable intentions of the parties on the right of cessation. Recognizing that such evidence is inconclusive as to the parties' actual intentions, a court may present its findings as the constructive or reasonable
expectations of the parties. 45 Assume for example that after an increase
in the worldwide price of crude oil a domestic oil supplier seeks to terminate an agreement that contains no conditions precedent to the supplier's obligation to perform. If the supplier had performed after
40

E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 482.

41 Id at 492-95. Of course, the parties also may have failed to foresee a cessation problem. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
42
These are often referred to as implied-in-fact allocations. See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (D. Mass. 1980); 407 East 61st Garage, Inc. v.
Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 280, 244 N.E.2d 37, 40, 296 N.Y.S.2d 338, 342 (1968).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (seller who
had characterized its computer system as "truly revolutionary" held to bear risk of engineering difficulties); Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963) (that plaintiff contractor voluntarily prepared specifications incorporated in government contract for data-gathering systems implies that contractor will adhere to those
specifications).
44 See, e.g., Paramount Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc. v. Hughes Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. &
C.3d 677, af'd, 249 Pa. Super. 625, 377 A.2d 1001 (1977).
45 See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 876-77.
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previous similar price increases, a court may conclude that the parties
reasonably expected that the supplier would assume the risk of the particular price increase. Similarly, a court may find that a franchisee reasonably expected that its franchise would not be cancelled arbitrarily as
long as it performed satisfactorily, in light of the franchisor's representations to that effect to other similarly situated franchisees.
The reasonable expectations approach holds the parties to a standard of reasonableness by focusing on what a reasonable person would
have expected under the circumstances. The approach is justified on
freedom of contract grounds as an attempt to enforce the parties' probable intentions,4 6 or, at least, what one party should have known the
other intended.4 7 In many situations, however, the evidence as to the
expectations of a reasonable person may be quite unpersuasive.4 8
The implications of contractual silence, for example, are often misleading. A court may reason that a promisor assumed a particular risk
because it failed to insist on contractual language to cover that contingency. 49 To illustrate, a court may conclude that a large oil supplier
assumed the risk of price increases simply because of the absence of any
conditions precedent to the duty to supply oil in the agreement. Although the parties may have allocated the risk of all price rises to the
supplier, it may be more reasonable to assume that the parties only intended to allocate the risk of certain expected increases to the supplier
and not the risk of unexpected dramatic increases. The oil supplier, one
may argue, would have insisted on a higher contract price or exacted
other compensation if it had intended to insure the oil supply regardless
of the price. 50 To cite another example, a contractor's failure to provide
for payment upon substantial performance does not necessarily suggest
that the owner is excused from- payment unless "every brick is in place."
46

See id at 877-78.
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 523.
See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91 (E.D. Pa.
1980) ("The parties may both be better served by an informed judicial decision based on the
known circumstances than by a decision wrenched from words of the contract which were not
chosen with a prevision of today's circumstances."); see also Dawson, Economic Duress and the
Fair Exchange in French and German Law, I1 TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937); Farnsworth, supra note
15, at 867-68.
49 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944). Professor Farnsworth has pointed out that such an assumption is usually made when the issue involves the
restriction of a duty expressed in absolute language. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 886.
He adds that silence generally is nnt interpreted against a party in controversies involving the
imposition of a constructive duty on the other party. Id
50 See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. at 70 (supplier only
assumed risk of normal price increases); Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 885; Speidel, supra note
15, at 377-78, 395. Evidence of a supplier's previous performance in the face of price increases
is not especially probative of intent if the previous increases were not of the magnitude of the
increase under consideration. See infra Part II (discussing implication of silence in other cessation contexts).
47
48
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The failure of a contract to allocate the particular risk, therefore, may
be of only marginal relevance to the intentions inquiry.
The foreseeability test has refined the approach of courts to the
problem of contractual silence. In particular, courts in cases involving
excuse from performance theorize that in the absence of conditioning
language the promisor must have intended to assume all foreseeable
risks. 5 1 However, the parties may simply have failed to allocate even

foreseeable risks. 52 Conversely, the parties may have intended that the
promisor ensure performance by assuming all risks, including unforeseeable ones. 53 Thus, because a party may have assumed risks of which it
was unaware, or may purposefully have avoided liability for known
risks, the foreseeability approach for determining intention is unreliable
54
and should not alone control the allocation issue.
In addition, courts must confront the difficulty of determining
whether a contingency was foreseeable. To some extent all commercial
contingencies are foreseeable. The question is better put in terms of how
foreseeable the occurrence was. Determining the extent of foreseeability, however, necessitates difficult linedrawing and other unrelated factors often can control the determination. For example, one suspects that
the degree of harm the party with the performance duty will suffer may
"control" the foreseeability issue. 55 In the oil supply problem, if the
price increase was sufficiently large that the supplier would suffer great
harm if forced to perform, a court may conclude that the price rise was
56
unforeseeable, and hence, that the supplier had not assumed the risk.
51 See, e.g., Salinger v. General Exch. Ins. Corp., 217 Iowa 560, 250 N.W. 13 (1933);
Raner v. Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927). Generally, courts find against the
party seeking to terminate when events should have alerted the party to the possibility of a
contingency occurring. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.,
517 F. Supp. 440, 454-55 (E.D. Va. 1981); U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1977).
52 See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. at
455.
54 Some courts recognize that foreseeability should not control the allocation of the risk.
See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d at 318; Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. at 76; see also Comment, ContrattualFlexibility in a Volatile
Economy: Saving UC.C. Section 2-615ftom the Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032 (1978); id
sources cited at 1037 n.30.
55 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 353 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
aft'd, 405 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1978).
56 If the price increase was unforeseeable, the discharge of the supplier does not harm
the purchaser because the purchaser has not paid for performance under the prevailing market conditions. Requiring the supplier to deliver would result in an undeserved gain to the
purchaser. See Speidel, supra note 15, at 405. In Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc.,
499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the court ordered an equitable price adjustment when the
circumstances were foreseeable, but unanticipated. The court further indicated that "severe
out of pocket losses" were essential to its decision to grant relief. Id at 92. See also Speidel,
Excusable Nonperformancein Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. Rv.
241, 266 n.73 (1980).
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Courts also employ the theory of economic efficiency to establish
the reasonable expectations of the parties. This theory asserts that contracting parties allocate risks to maximize their joint welfare. 57 If the oil
supplier can ensure a source of supply at a stable price less expensively
than the purchaser, for example, one may infer that the parties' intentions were that the risks involved in failing to ensure a source of supply
would fall on the supplier. Similarly, one may conclude that parties to a
franchise agreement would allocate the risk of a failure of best efforts to
the franchisee, which can control its own performance efforts. 58 The
efficiency formulation is only of limited help, however, because parties
do not always allocate risks efficiently. 59 For example, a party may be
willing to sacrifice gain in the short run, if it expects that immediate
concessions will result in greater gain in future agreements. 60 In addition, employing hindsight to ascertain the efficient allocation will be
6
problematic in many instances. '
Judges also rely on their assumptions about how parties bargaining
fairly would allocate risks in ascertaining the parties' reasonable expectations. Courts, for example, may excuse the oil supplier from performance after a large unexpected price rise on the theory that parties
bargaining fairly and in good faith would not have allocated such an
onerous risk to the supplier. 62 By way of further illustration, a contractor may be entitled to payment despite its failure to "put every brick in
place," because parties bargaining fairly presumably would not include
such a harsh condition precedent to performance. The greater the
obfuscation of the parties' intentions on cessation, the more one suspects
that the fairness factor controls the "finding" on that issue. 63 When the
57 See Speidel, supra note 15, at 381-82; see also Posner & Rosenfeld, Impossibility and RelatedDoctrinesin Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89-90 (1977); Speidel, supra note 15, at 376 n.32, 385, 393-94. See generaly Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980).
58 See Goetz & Scott, Pi'ciples of Relational Contract, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1142-43
(1981). To cite another example, because an offeror can frame the offer clearly he should
bear the risk of reasonable reliance when the offer is unclear on the right to revoke. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 (1979).

59 See, e.g., Goldberg, RelationalExchange, 23 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 337, 339 (1980); Speidel,
supra note 15, at 396-400.
60 See Macneil, Economic Anaysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the Needfor a
"Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018, 1023-25 (1981).
61 See Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 110-11; Speidel, supra note 15, at 396. The
inquiry requires determining who can best prevent a risk from occurring, and who is the best
insurer of unpreventable risks. See Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 90-91.
62 See Nora Springs Coop. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that "[it] is not enough that the transaction has become less
profitable for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration must be so
severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment a (1979). For criticism of
this approach, see Note, UC.C § 2-615. Excising the Impracticable, 60 B.U.L. REV. 575, 589
(1980).
63 See generally Parev Prods. Co. v. I Rokeach & Sons, Inc. 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir.
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court's view of fairness controls the decision, courts should abandon the
intentions construct and articulate more precisely the bases for their
decisions.

3.

64

Gaps

Instead of incomplete or poor drafting of a provision concerning
cessation, the evidence may clearly show that the parties failed to determine the right of cessation at all.6 5 Contracting parties may fail to con-

sider and plan for contingencies that will arise because of the limitations
of the human mind and imagination in anticipating the future, 66 a
problem exacerbated by our complex technological society. 6 7 The par-

ties may also fail to focus on foreseeable contingencies or, having considered them, may simply dismiss them as unlikely to occurm or fail to

agree on the proper allocation of their risk.6 9 Courts generally abandon
the reasonable expectations approach in such cases and attempt, partic1941) ("'Intention of the parties' is a good formula by which to square doctrine with result.
That this is true has long been an open secret."); Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 877-79.
64
Where the parties' intentions are not clear, courts may apply a rule of law to ascertain
the rights of the parties. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1111
(D. Mass. 1980); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1685, 1734 (1976).
65 In Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 72-73, 423 A.2d 713, 720-21 (1981), for
example, the court recognized that in barring the termination of a newspaper distributorship
because of the expenditures that were incurred in making the distributorship successful, the
court was 'judicially creating terms of a contract" and "providing for a contingency not
contemplated or discussed by the parties." Nonetheless, the court felt that such a solution
was "fair, reasonable and, indeed, necessary under the circumstances of [the] case." See also
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclssical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 854, 874 (1978) ("More or less drastic changes in
outside circumstances constantly effect contractual adjustments, however firmly the parties
may appear to be holding to their original course."). As Professor Macneil points out, change
is a "permanent characteristic of modem technological societies." Id at 889. Professors
Goetz and Scott, borrowing terminology from Professor Macneil, use the phrase "relational"
contracts to describe agreements in which "the parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations." Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1091.
66 See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 63 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(difficulty of avoiding "risk of economic changes"); Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1090 n.4;
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 726 (1974).
67
See Macneil,supra note 66, at 726 ("Even the simplest and clearest promise, supported
by conditions most conducive to its performance and backed by the most intense social, economic and legal pressure for performance, is not, at the instant it is made, the same thing as
its actual performance in the future.'); see also Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 871-72.
68 See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
("Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation."); I.
MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 8-9 (1980); Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 870-76
(parties may have failed to foresee the foreseeable); Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 100.
69 See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318-19 (D.C. Cir.
1966). In Transatlantic, the parties neglected to specify the shipping route assuming the ship
would sail the customary route through the Suez Canal. At the time of contract, the Canal
had already been nationalized; the Egyptians closed the Canal after the ship set sail. The
ship altered its route.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:617

ularly as regards unforeseeable contingencies, 70 to predict how the par-

ties would have allocated the risk had they considered the
contingency. 7 1 In adhering too closely to the intention-of-the-parties
fiction, however, a court may fail to identify and explain carefully the
72
factors that compel its decision.

4. Conclusion
Cases involving excuse doctrines such as impossibility, impracticability, and frustration are a common setting for the discussion of cessa70
When the contingency is deemed unforeseeable, courts cannot rely on the parties'
intentions to fill contractual gaps because it is clear that the parties had no intentions. See
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 867.
71 See, e.g., Maple Farms Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784,
789-90 (1974) (fair to allocate risk to supplier because purpose of contract was to "guard
against fluctuation of price"); C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 60-61; Farnsworth, supra note 15, at
879-80; see also Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 865 (detailing various approaches of scholars to
problem of gaps-e.g., Glanville Williams's description of terms the parties had in mind,
terms they would have expressed had issue been raised, and terms implied on basis of fairness,
and Professor Corbin's view that implied-in-fact terms are those parties intended, whereas
constructive terms are those parties would have intended or that justice would require).
72 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va.
1981), is a case in point. Westinghouse had agreed to fuel two Florida Power and Light nuclear steam supply systems and to remove the spent fuel from the reactors. The court found
that both parties contemplated that the spent fuel would be reprocessed, from which Westinghouse would recoup between $16 and $19 million. The litigation arose when Westinghouse, after operating the plants for three years, indicated that it could not remove the spent
fuel because it could not reach agreement with a reprocessing firm, and when two more years
later President Carter foreclosed commercial reprocessing as an option. The court noted that
spent fuel had never been commercially reprocessed at the time of the agreement, in spite of
both the government's efforts to encourage that approach and the contractual provision binding Westinghouse to remove the spent fuel. Accordingly, the court held that Westinghouse
had assumed the risk of any difficulties, even an unforeseeable one like President Carter's ban
on commercial reprocessing.
Reasons other than the parties' "intentions" may actually have governed the decision in
Westtnghoure. First, concerning the harm to the respective parties from enforcement or cessation of Westinghouse's obligation to remove spent fuel, the court indicated that Florida had
already incurred expenditures in excess of $9 million, with future potential costs of $1 million
per day for replacement power, whereas Westinghouse had failed to show that it lost money
on the "'package deal' of plant and fuel contracts for Florida." Id at 453. In addition, the
court intimated that Westinghouse was willing to accept some loss from the deal because it
hoped that the Florida plants would promote its position in the nuclear power industry.
Second, the court noted that Westinghouse had acted unreasonably during negotiations
and in its performance of the contract. Evidence suggested that Westinghouse had insufficient knowledge in computing its cost assumptions for the fuel contracts. In addition, the
court characterized Westinghouse's attempts to obtain a facility for reprocessing before the
presidential ban as "less than zealous." Id at 455. The court found that Westinghouse had
not shown that its failure to obtain reprocessing "resulted from causes beyond its reasonable
control." Id at 459.
Third, efficiency considerations suggested that the risk that commercial reprocessing facilities would be unavailable should be placed on Westinghouse. The court indicated that
Florida had no "expertise in nuclear power," id at 444, and desired a fixed-price contract,
whereas Westinghouse had "nuclear knowledge and capability." Westinghouse, therefore,
was in a better position to safeguard against increased costs in the removal of the spent fuel.
See a/so Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 876-81.
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tion rights. These cases generally involve the allocation of risk of events
or conditions beyond the parties' control. 73 The issue of cessation is,
however, common to other situations as well. For example, contract
terms together with the overall circumstances may not clearly indicate
whether an agreement is terminable at will or for cause, or whether a
particular breach entitles the injured party to cease performance. 74 In
these and other contexts, 75 a court's decision on cessation will include
consideration of the fairness norms that are the subject of the next subsection. As noted above, fairness concerns may also overturn express
cessation clauses. 76 Although fairness has no single meaning 77 and in the
abstact is too broad to be very useful, 78 the boundaries are definable
when the concept is set against the backdrop of the various cessation
settings.
B.

Supplementing Freedom of Contract: Fairness in Contract
Cessation

When the evidence concerning the parties' intentions on cessation is
inadequate or the parties had no intentions, or when the enforceability
of an express cessation clause is uncertain, courts rely heavily on fairness
norms in framing their decision on the propriety of cessation. Generally,
courts compare the parties' positions if the contract were performed
with their positions if performance were discharged. 79 This approach
effectuates at least four fairness norms. This Part begins with an analysis of these fairness norms, followed by a brief observation concerning
appropriate remedies when the fairness norms favor enforcement of the
contract, and concludes with an examination of the relationship between the fairness norms and other social policy reasons for cessation.
1. The FairnessNorms
a. Comparative Equities. In comparing the positions of the parties
engaged in a cessation dispute, courts typically balance the reliance and
expectancy interests of the party seeking performance80 against the prospective economic harm of the party seeking cessation. This balancing
73 See infra notes 208-37 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 165-207, 238-47 and accompanying text.
75 See infra Part II.
76 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
77 See Anderson, Conflicts ofInterest: Efcieney, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 738, 745, 746 n.25 (1978).
78 See, e.g., Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the U.C.C: Good Faith and the
Doctrine ofEconomic Duress, 64 IowA L. REV. 849, 877-78 (1979).
79 See infia Part II.
80 For a discussion of the reliance and expectancy interests, see generally Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2.
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approach sorts out the potential gains and losses in the cessation problem so that courts can properly discern the interests at stake.
The party seeking enforcement of the contract may assert a reliance
interest consisting of expenses incurred in anticipation of, or in partial
performance of, a contract, or consisting of opportunities foregone upon
entering the contract. A franchisee in an agreement of indefinite duration, for example, may expend large sums purchasing franchise equipment and otherwise preparing for performance in addition to foregoing
other business opportunities.
Some authorities suggest that reliance consisting of expenditures
necessary to performance of the contract should have greater weight in
the balancing process than nonessential reliance expendituress ' or reliance in the form of opportunities foregone.8 2 Essential reliance expenditures, such as the purchase of franchise equipment, make the strongest
case for relief because they are direct and generally foreseeable. In addition, essential reliance expenditures should result in provable out-ofpocket losses. 83 Although nonessential reliance expenditures should also
result in provable out-of-pocket losses, they are more remote. Some of a
franchisee's organizational expenses, for example, may not have been
essential for performance and, hence, may not have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of agreement. 8 4 Foregone opportunities may also be unforeseeable even though they are a direct result of
reliance on the contract. In reliance on performance, for example, a
franchisee may forego other franchising opportunities of which the
franchisor was reasonably unaware. Even if other opportunities were
foreseeable, courts may hesitate to consider such reliance because one
cannot be sure whether the party seeking enforcement (like the franchisee) would have availed itself of the opportunity or whether that op81 See, e.g., Walker v. Ireton, 221 Kan. 314, 322-23, 559 P.2d 340, 346-47 (1977) (buyer's
selling of farm in anticipation of acquiring property held incidental reliance and therefore
insufficient to bar assertion of statute of frauds); 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 533A, at 809-10 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1960). See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2,
at 78-79 for a discussion of essential and incidental reliance. Essential reliance expenditures
are those actually incurred in performance or necessarily incurred in preparation for performance. Incidental reliance expenditures, on the other hand, are not required for performance
or preparation for performance. For example, the purchase by the buyer of Blackacre of
special fixtures suitable only for Blackacre is an incidental reliance expenditure. See also D.
DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.1, at 790-91 (1973); Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704, 723-28 (1982).
82 See, e.g., Caplan v. Roberts, 506 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1974) (seller permitted to invoke
statute of frauds in defending plaintiff buyer's claim for failure to deliver equipment even
though buyer would lose expected profits on the planned resale of equipment because buyer
had foregone opportunity to purchase equipment elsewhere). See also Hudec,supra note 81, at
719-21 (discussing reliance in terms of foregone opportunities and out-of-pocket
expenditures).
83 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 87.
84 Similarly, special fixtures purchased for Blackacre would normally not be within the
contemplation of the parties. See supra note 81.
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portunity would have been profitable. Despite these distinctions, courts
should consider nonessential reliance or reliance in the form of lost opportunities in cessation cases when they are not too remote or
speculative.8 5
Generally, in resolving the cessation issue, courts appear to focus
more on the magnitude and type of reliance expenditures than on
whether they benefit the other party.8 6 When cessation is appropriate,
however, the restitution interest 87 is often important in the formulation
of remedies. When courts discharge a party on excuse grounds, for example, the discharged party must return benefits that were conferred by
the other party. Courts typically ignore, however, any reliance expenditures that do not benefit the discharged party. 88
Courts also consider the gains that the party seeking enforcement
could expect from performance of the contract. 89 When the right to
cease performance is unclear, however, the parties' expectations are not
ascertainable. The expectations of a franchisee in an agreement that
contains a termination "for any reason" clause, for example, may vary
widely depending on interpretation of the clause. If the clause means
that the franchisor can terminate only for performance related reasons,
the franchisee would expect certain benefits if performance was satisfactory. If on the other hand, the clause means that the franchisor can
terminate arbitrarily, the franchisee would expect those benefits only if
the franchisor does not terminate. Thus, if the meaning of the clause is
uncertain, the franchisee's expectations necessarily are uncertain as well.
85 See D. DoBBS, supra note 81, at 791 (recovery of incidental reliance should be "limited, if at all, [oin the principles limiting other claims of special damages"). Professor Fuller
suggested that expectancy is awarded as "the most effective means of compensating for detrimental reliance," and indicated that such reliance includes "losses involved in foregoing the
opportunity to enter other contracts." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 60.
86 E.g., McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.
1973); Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Knight, 70 Cal. 2d 327, 450 P.2d 42, 74 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1969); Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 423 A.2d 713 (1981).
87 Set Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 53-54. Expenditures of a franchisee in readying
itself for performance, such as organizational expenses, do not directly benefit the franchisor;
the franchise fee and the price paid to the franchisor for equipment are a direct benefit. The
latter expenditures are referred to as the restitution interest of the franchisee. See the discussion in Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853, 856-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
88 See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
89 In considering whether an oil company could terminate one of its stations, one court
stated that the station owner's "investment and vety livelihood depend on his remaining within
the good graces of Shell's local employees." Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357,
372, 294 A.2d 253, 261 (1972) (emphasis added), afd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); see also Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 880 (8th Cir.
1979) (in rejecting oil company's right to terminate franchisee, court noted that dealer "was
lead to believe that he was entering into a dealership with excellent prospects for an extended
period of time'), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Baker v. Ratzlaff, I Kan. App. 2d 285, 564
P.2d 153 (1977) (buyer of popcorn entitled to expectancy despite technical breach which
seller asserted as grounds for termination); see also infra Part II.
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A purchaser's right to performance under the contract in the face of
large unexpected increases in the cost of its supplier's performance is
another example of uncertain expectations. 90
Courts faced with uncertainty on cessation often consider the gains
expected from performance in determining the enforcement right, at
least when the expected gains are coupled with material reliance expenditures. 9' Such reliance expenditures are an investment for a future
return; if the return is denied, the relying party is harmed by not having
invested elsewhere. 92 Even if the court is uncertain whether a party is
entitled to the return under the contract, expected gains are, therefore,
still relevant to the overall fairness inquiry. Nevertheless, like reliance in
the form of lost opportunities, courts ordinarily consider such uncertain
gains to be less significant than essential reliance losses in the balancing
93
process.
The courts must balance the reliance interest and the expected
gains of the party seeking performance against the expected losses of the
party seeking cessation. 94 These losses may consist of the excess cost of
performance over the income from the deal, such as when increased
costs to a manufacturer of raw materials make performance unprofitable, or when a seller delivers valuable goods under the erroneous impression that they are valueless. Harm may also consist of the depreciation
in value of what a party is to receive, such as when the government
curtails the anticipated profitable use of a leasehold 95 or when the other
party fails to perform satisfactorily. 96 Courts generally have not explicitly considered lost investment opportunity, such as the opportunity of
an oil supplier to unload oil on the market after huge price increases, in
the balancing process. 97 Because the oil supplier presumably would
have the opportunity to invest on the market if it had the right to cease
performance, when the parties' position on cessation is unclear, excluding lost investment opportunity in evaluating the fairness of cessation
seems unjustified.
The comparative equities analysis is most useful when the interests
of one party greatly outweigh those of the other. If, for example, the
party urging cessation stands to lose very little if required to perform,
90
91

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89; infra note 172. But see 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 81, at § 533A

(expected gains insufficient to work estoppel of statute of frauds).
92 An investment by a franchisee in "building" a franchise, for example, is made with
the expectation of future profits. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.

93 See Harvey, DicretionagJusticeunder the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 666, 678 (1982) (traditionally courts have preferred to protect "capital values" over
"income, profits or opportunities").
94 See infra Part II.
95

See infa notes 208-37 and accompanying text.

96
97

See in/a notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Aluminum Co. ofAm. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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but the party seeking performance incurred substantial preparation or
part-performance costs and reasonably expects a fair return on its investment, the comparative equities favor a decision against cessation. In
closer cases, such as when the contract is a losing one for the party urging cessation but, again, the other party has incurred substantial reliance expenses, a court may fall back on the implied-term analysis to
decide against the party that it feels should have protected itself by including a term in the contract. 98 If a supplier has promised to perform,
courts will hold it to its contractual duty even under exigent circumstances. Similarly, if a contract is silent on duration, courts will deem it
terminable-at-will.
When balancing the equities proves inconclusive, perhaps instead
courts should adopt a concept of sharing gains and losses. Even when,
on balance, cessation seems appropriate, courts should grant relief to a
relying party not only for its restitution interest, but also for its other
reliance expenditures (but not for lost profits). 99 Alternatively, if performance is to proceed, perhaps the courts should grant a party facing
forfeiture an equitable adjustment in the terms of the contract.'00 Sharing has not been a favored remedy in the law, perhaps because of the
large amount of discretion it would afford judges. Accordingly, contract
law has been slow to accept a sharing approach. 0 1 As we shall see in
Part I, however, modern contract law may be turning away from its
10 2
traditional aversion to a sharing approach.
Do courts compare equities when confronted with an express cessation clause? Assuming free assent, the balancing analysis is heavily
weighted in favor of the party asserting the contract term because of
adherence to the principle of freedom of contract.' 0 3 In addition, fairness dictates that if the parties have freely agreed on a cessation ap98 . See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
99 But see supra text accompanying note 88; infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
Professors Posner and Rosenfeld posit a hypothetical involving the sale of a specially manufactured printing machine to a buyer whose premises are destroyed by fire, thereby rendering
the machine useless to the buyer. Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 92-94. The solution
according to Posner and Rosenfeld depends on who could best insure against the risk. Alternatively, perhaps the parties should share the loss by compensating the seller for reliance
expenditures, but denying a lost profit recovery.
100 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 15, at 404-05; in/ia notes 234-37 and accompanying text;
see also Note, supra note 48, at 596-99.
101 Generally, courts have been unreceptive to a sharing approach, see, e.g., Carroll v.
Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 274, 164 P. 143, 144 (1917), except when the reliance loss constitutes part payment, see 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 37, § 1363, at 511, or benefits the other party.
For notions of partial excuse and divisibility that mitigate against the all-or-nothing approach, see, for example, E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 702.
102 The resistance to sharing may be easing. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2) and comment c (1979); Young, HalfMeasures, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 19, 32
(1981); see also Note, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutog Souion, 69 YAL. LJ. 1054 (1960). But see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 705.
103 See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
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proach, courts should enforce it. 104 Even when the parties have
allocated the cessation risk, however, in extreme situations courts may
avoid imposing the express term. Courts may rely on the doctrines of
unconscionability or forfeiture when exercise of a cessation clause would
cause extreme harm to the disadvantaged party, but failure to exercise
the clause would not damage the other party. 0 5 Thus, an express cessation clause is but one factor (albeit a significant one) in the comparative
equities analysis.
b. Harm-Avoidance. Frequently in cessation litigation, one party's
potential out-of-pocket losses from either cessation or continued per06
formance greatly outweigh the prospective losses of the other party.
These cases fall into two categories. In the first one, a party seeking to
enforce the agreement will suffer a material reliance loss from termination. 10 7 A franchisee who has made significant expenditures in reliance
on a contract of indefinite duration, or a contractor who, prior to
breach, has incurred substantial costs in preparation or part performance falls into this category. If the franchisee's performance satisfied
industry standards or the contractor's breach was immaterial, continued
performance may not harm the other party. In the second category, the
party seeking to cease performance will suffer a material out-of-pocket
loss by continued performance. A supplier in a long term contract may
experience dramatic, unexpected increases in the cost of performance. 08
If the purchaser has not relied on performance, its interest would be
limited to the potential gains from the now favorable contract. As we
have seen, however, the purchaser may not be entitled to these gains
because the supplier may not have agreed to perform under the exigent
circumstances. 109

In each situation, the party facing a material loss is dependent on
the other party either to continue performance or to agree to cessation,
as the case may be. The increasing willingness of courts to bar cessation
or to permit it 110 to avoid material harm demonstrates the special significance of harm-avoidance in cessation analysis and establishes the duty
of a contracting party to make performance decisions that avoid severe
See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
See infa Part II. Professor Speidel criticizes adherence to the "arithmetic of loss" in
U.C.C. § 2-615 cases. Speidel, supra note 56, at 267.
107
See infia notes 165-207 and accompanying text.
108 See infha notes 208-37 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 56. On the other hand, it may be equally uncertain whether the supplier is entitled to a discharge under the circumstances. In such situations, courts may favor
the supplier because they appear to treat out-of-pocket losses as more worthy of relief than
losses to income. See in/ra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
110 See in/a notes 167-68, 212-16, 243-47 and accompanying text.
104

105
106
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harm to the dependent party."' Although contract law has traditionally recognized the parties' unilateral discretion to terminate contracts
at will, to insist upon performance after unanticipated events, or to terminate after material breach, courts have significantly restricted that
112
discretion on fairness grounds.
The duty owed to the dependent party is analogous to a fiduciary
duty. 113 Fiduciary relationships require close supervision to protect a
party from the exploitation that may occur when one party enjoys an
advantaged position over the other party. 114 A position of dependency
may also develop in situations outside the traditional boundaries of
fiduciary relationships whenever one party has a great interest in performance or faces forfeiture from performance.115
While fiduciaries must often consider their principals' interests
above their own, 116 no such subordination of self-interest is required in
'the cessation context. Instead, in deciding whether to cease a relationship or to insist on performance a contracting party must balance a duty
to the dependent party with its economic self-interest." 7 Within a wide
"'l
Contracting parties are "joined in a common enterprise" and have the duty to "share
unexpected benefits and losses. . . ." C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 72; see also Raz, Book Review, 95 HARv.L. REv. 916, 933 (1982) ("The purpose of contract law should be . . .to
protect both the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations and the individuals who rely
on that practice.") (emphasis in original).
112
See Part II for illustrations. Discretion does not include the decision whether to
breach a contract and pay damages; the party making that decision has thepower to breach
but not the right. Even the power of a contracting party to breach and pay damages is circumscribed by the expanding remedy of specific performance. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716(1)
(1977).
113
In Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 953 (1980), the court found that American Oil owed a fiduciary duty to Arnott, its franchisee. Most cases have not gone that far, but do, however, indicate that the franchisor's duty
is like that of a fiduciary. See Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionabiliy--FranchiseeRemediesfor
Termination, 29 Bus. LAW. 227, 234 (1973). The function of fiduciaries "is that of recommending or making decisions of a discretionary nature about the management or investment
of the property of others." Anderson, supra note 77, at 757; see also Brown, Franchising-A
F'duciagy Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REV. 650 (1971); cf Speidel, supra note 15, at 407.
114 See authorities cited supra note 113. Transactions involving mortgagors and mortgagees, attorneys, executors, joint venturers, and creditors and debtors, for example, are subject
to close scrutiny because of the dependent party's economic necessities or because the powerful party enjoys inordinate discretion in the governance of the particular relation. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 279-80 (1947) (shift in
burden of proof to powerful party is common in such cases); Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at
1126-27 (there exists "special duty" to protect interests of dependent party); Hillman, supra
note 78, at 894; cf.Speidel, supra note 15, at 407 ("[I]mposition of ex post bargaining duties
. . . protects important relational norms and tends to neutralize the advantaged party's
opportunism.").
115 Hillman, supra note 78, at 883, 894.
116 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1128-29.
117 To some extent, in a successful contractual relationship the interests of the parties are
shared. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1979); Shell Oil
Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 372, 294 A.2d 253, 261 (1972) (relationship was a
"franchise. . .for the marketing of Shell's products, in which both parties have a common
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range the parties are free to allocate costs and benefits as they desire,
and legitimate bargaining power may entitle one of the parties to a
larger share of the fruits of the contract.11 8
Intervention therefore is least appropriate when the projected harm
to the dependent party results from a clearly allocated risk. 119 Even
when risk allocation is clear, however, the prospect of severe harm to a
party may override the justification of freedom of contract. 120 When
risk allocation is unclear, the harm-avoidance norm protects each party
from inordinate loss resulting from the exchange in the absence of countervailing harm to the other party.12 1 Absent substantial loss from cessation, therefore, a party may not insist on performance of a contract in
which the other party will incur severe costs. Similarly, a party that will
suffer no substantial harm by performing cannot cease performance if
the other party will suffer material harm as a result. For both explicit
and ambiguous cessation agreements one cannot delineate precisely the.
magnitude of harm sufficient to trigger a protective court response. Generally, the courts attempt to do what is reasonable under the circumstances. Constructs such as materiality, substantiality, forfeiture,
foundation, and essence of the deal, are all efforts to determine whether
keeping the deal together or calling it off is "more comfortable to
1 22
justice."
In some cases, the analysis is more difficult because the prospective
material harm to each party is very similar in magnitude. For example,
a franchisee may have expended large sums in preparation, but the
interest and profit from the activities of the other"), aft',63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); see also C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 69-73. U.C.C. § 2-615,
comment 6, provides: "In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either
answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse,' adjustment under the
various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity. . . ." See also GOLDBERG, RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 337, 339 (1980) (opportunism has
been defined as "tak[ing] advantage of the other's vulnerability . . .engag[ing] in strategic
behavior, or. . .follow[ing ones'] own interests at the expense of the other party"); Speidel,
supra note 15, at 408-09 n.168.
118 Anderson, supra note 77, at 746 n.25 ("[T]he legal test of fairness is the result which
would be obtained in an arms' length bargain between a willing buyer and a willing seller
with roughly equal bargaining power."). But see Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 513 ("[A] condition is obviously unfair if all the risks are borne by one party while the benefits go to the
other.").
119 Conversely, when harm results from a risk that was not clearly allocated, gains and
losses are "undeserved." Speidel, supra note 15, at 405.
120 See supra notes 33-39; infa notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
121
The comparative-equities and harm-avoidance norms are very similar. Unlike the
comparative-equities norm, however, the harm-avoidance norm focuses primarily on out-ofpocket losses.
122
RESTATEMFNT OF CONTRACTS § 275 comment a (1932) (material breach); see also 6
A. CORBIN, supra note 37, § 1322, at 327; I. MACNEIL, supra note 68, at 52 (solidarity norm);
Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together after Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, The
UCC,and The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553 (1976); in/a note
155 and accompanying text.
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franchisor may be reluctant to continue performance because of adverse
market conditions. When the parties' agreement on cessation is clear, it
should control because the harm-avoidance approach is inconclusive
and, therefore, offers little guidance. When the parties' approach to cessation is unclear or they did not consider cessation, however, they should
share the losses. Because the parties, joined in a common venture, did
not allocate the risk of the particular circumstances (or, at least, their
intentions are not cognizable), there is little reason to assign the entire
loss to one party. 123 Only recently have courts begun to expressly adopt
such a sharing approach.124
c. Reasonableness. Not all cases involving material harm restrict
the right to cease performance or the right to insist on performance.
Courts also consider whether the party suffering harm behaved reasonably. If the harm suffered by a party was the result of that party's own
unreasonable conduct, courts discount the harm in the balancing process. 125 The failure of a franchisee to satisfy a general standard of performance in the trade because of managerial incompetence, for
example, may entitle the franchisor to terminate the relationship despite
the franchisee's material reliance loss. 12 6 On the other hand, unavoidable temporary performance failures that are easily rectifiable, may not
establish grounds for termination. Similarly, a court's decision on a contractor's repudiation of its bid because of a mistake, may depend on the
12 7
contractor's standard of care in submitting the bid.
Generally, a reasonableness test involves measuring conduct against
that of similarly situated parties, or barring such evidence, against general community standards.128 Sometimes the test is more specific. The
"reasonableness" inquiry may include examining which party was in
the best position to provide against a risk.' 29 In the oil supply problem,
for example, a court might allocate the risk to the party that was in the
123 See Hudec, supra note 81, at 716.
124 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text; infra notes 234-37 and accompanying
text.
125 See, e.g., 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 37, § 1323; Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 98.
126 Professor Gellhorn discusses an example in which a franchisee's sales are "substantially below the average dealer's performance in his region-for example. . . twenty-five per
cent below a reasonable quota. . . ." Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 515.
127 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Curran, Inc. v. State, 106 N.H. 558, 215 A.2d 702 (1965) (requiring only ordinary care in preparation of bid); James T. Taylor & Son, Inc. v. Arlington Ind.
School Dist., 160 Tex. 617, 335 S.W.2d 371 (1960) (requiring only lack of carelessness that
violates positive duty).
128 See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 140 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911
(1980); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Ct. App. Mo.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258
N.Y. 194, 199, 179 N.E. 383, 384 (1932).
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best position to assure a source of supply. 30° Such an allocation is fair,
the argument goes, because the "efficient" risk bearer reasonably should
have taken action to protect itself; forcing the other party to bear the
loss when the risk materializes would be inequitable. 13 1 This element of
reasonableness is only helpful, of course, when the court can identify the
efficient risk bearer. 132 In addition, if it is clear that the parties did not
actually allocate a particular risk and that neither party had reasonable
expectations about who would assume the risk, one must question
whether the materialized risk should be foisted on a party simply because that party can bear the risk most efficiently. 133 One could argue
that if the risk had been allocated, the more efficient risk bearer would
have demanded further compensation, especially when the risk involved
34

severe losses. 1

d. Recirocity. 135 Discussion by courts of lost profits due to cessation and their subsequent award of expectancy damages 36 demonstrates
the importance of the reciprocity norm. The reciprocity norm dictates
that each party should enjoy the fruits of an exchange in roughly equal
balance. 137 It does not mean that each party must enjoy equal benefits
from the performance of a contract, but rather that within the parameters of the parties' bargain each party is entitled to its quid pro quo.
Thus, when the contract clearly does not grant a party the right to cease
performance, fairness, as well as freedom of contact, may compel performance. For example, in an employment contract for a certain
unexpired term the employer may not terminate an employee who has
130 See, e.g., CanadianIndus. Alcohol, 258 N.Y. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384; Joskow, Commercial
Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 153-62
(1977). A court may also consider who was in the best position to insure against a risk. E.g.,
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
131 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 15, at 393 n.117.
132 Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), addressed
the question of who was in the best position to insure against the risk of the Suez Canal
closing; nevertheless, one suspects that the case was actually decided on the basis of the relatively small additional costs involved:
The only factor operating here in appellant's favor is the added expense, allegedly $43,972.00 above and beyond the contract price of $305,842.92, of
extending a 10,000 mile voyage by.approximately 3,000 miles . . . . [T]o

justify relief there must be more of a variation. . . than is present in this case.
Id at 319; see also Speidel, supra note 15, at 397-400, 420.
133 See Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 129, 310
N.E.2d 363, 367 (1974); Speidel, supra note 15, at 397-98.
134 MirharaConstr.Co., 365 Mass. at 129, 310 N.E.2d at 367; Speidel,supra note 15, at 39798.
135 This norm is also sometimes referred to as the principle of"subtantial equivalency of
exchange." See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 878-81.
136 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; infra notes 144-5 1; infra Part II.
137 For application of a similar standard to franchise termination, see Gellhorn, supra
note 21, at 517-18; see also U.C.C. § 2-306 (1977) ("unreasonably disproportionate" test in
requirements and output contracts); I. MACNEIL, supra note 68, at 46-47.
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performed satisfactorily, or in a supply contract, the supplier must perform if he has expressly promised to perform under the particular exigent circumstances. Conversely, when a party clearly has the right to
cease performance, such as when an employee has failed to satisfy a material condition precedent to the employer's obligation to perform, or
when a contract expressly excuses the supplier's performance under the
138
circumstances, fairness may deny further enforcement of the contract.
Even when the right of cessation is unclear and gains are uncertain,
courts may consider such gains in the fairness equation. 39 For example,
if a franchisor's decision to cease performance operates to the detriment
of the franchisee's expected (albeit uncertain) gains, courts may deny
the right of cessation, all other things being equal. 14°
2.

A Word About Remedies

When the court decides in favor of the party seeking performance,
it must then fashion an appropriate remedy. If the court overturns an
express cessation clause, it generally grants expectancy, on the theory
that, after excising the offending clause, it can enforce the remainder of
the contract.14' If the parties' position on cessation is unclear, however,
the remedy should reflect the loss suffered.' 4 2 Thus, if the fairness considerations emphasize the reliance losses, the reliance measure of recovery is appropriate. If the court also emphasizes expected gains from
performance, the court should award an expectancy recovery (which
necessarily includes essential reliance) .143 Some courts unmindful of this
consideration, however, have awarded an expectancy recovery even
though their focus was on a reliance loss. For example, although a court
emphasizes a franchisee's significant reliance expenditures, it may award
lost profits in addition. 44 In some of these cases, the degree of reliance
may persuade the court that the parties must have agreed to bar cessa45
tion because no "reasonable" party would have otherwise relied;
138
In such situations, the fairness norm of reciprocity is distinguishable from the principle of freedom of contract, which dictates the same result. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. See also Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (implied contract right to job security in
employment relationship); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977) (entitlement of employee to bonuses).
141 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977) (unconscionability permits court to excise offending
term and enforce remainder of contract).
142 See generaly D. DOBBS, supra note 81, at 3-4 ("The remedy is merely the means of
carrying into effect a substantive principle or policy.").
143 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 66-71.
144 See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. Section 90 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts resolves a similar problem by permitting courts to limit the plaintiff to reliance
damages in promissory estoppel cases.
145
See, e.g., Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1955); Shell Oil v. Mar-
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courts award expectancy because the party ceasing performance has
46
"breached" the contract.1
Courts may award expectancy, however, when the parties' position
on cessation is hopelessly unclear and the enforcement decision seems
based on a reliance loss.1 4 7 The underlying factor in the courts' decision
to enforce may be the dependent party's foregone opportunities which,

although too uncertain to be remedied themselves, are nonetheless com-

pelling. Assuming that the contract price did not deviate significantly
from the market price, awarding expectancy will mitigate against the

harshness of such losses. 148 For example, when the contract price approximates the value of an employee's services, an expectancy award
compensates a terminated employee for the lost opportunity of working

elsewhere. Another explanation for awarding expectancy, however, sim49
ply may be contract law's remedial bias in favor of expectancy.
Whatever its merits, contract law has established a remedial theory that

awards lost expectancy to injured parties even before they have relied on
their contracts. 150 The practice of granting expectancy awards in cessa-

tion cases to parties who have relied on their contract may reflect the
courts' desire to treat such parties at least as well. 15 1
3.

Conclusion. Reasons of Fairnessand Social Policy

Courts sometimes justify cessation decisions, at least in part, on the
economic and social policies of avoiding economic waste and promoting
the economy through contract formation. 52 The complex relationship
between policy based and individual fairness reasons is beyond the scope
nello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 373-74, 294 A.2d 253, 262 (1972), aJ'd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117
S.E. 706 (1923).
146
See Farnsworth, Legal Remediesfor Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1147
(1970) (Contract remedies seek to make injured party whole-"to put the promisee in the
position in which he would have been had the promise been performed . . . ."). This approach theoretically encourages parties to enter contractual relationships that benefit society
through specialization. See Hillman, supra note 122, at 556-58. Professor Fuller believed that
expectancy is the most easily administered standard and that courts prefer it for that reason.
He also believed that courts through force of habit apply expectancy more broadly than they
should. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 65-66.
147 See infra notes 170-73, 241-42 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 85.
149
Professor Fuller thought that reliance might "unlock the impulse to compel men to
make good their promises." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 69; see also supra note 146.
150
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 comment a (1979); Farnsworth,
Contracts During the Half Centu,7 Between Restatements, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 371, 372 (1981).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979); Farnsworth, supra at 37980. Professor Fuller suggested that expectancy awards encourage reliance on contracts.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 62.
151
For example, one might conjecture that the elaborate option contract theory was concocted to justify awarding expectancy to relying offerees. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 545 (1979).
152
See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318-19 (D.C. Cir.
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of this paper. 153 Nevertheless, some brief observations are appropriate.
First, courts typically stress fairness and reasonableness, whereas goal
related reasons are often mentioned only in passing or not at all.

54

Sec-

ond, even when courts mention goal related reasons, they generally dictate the same result as fairness reasons. Intuitively, waste-avoidance and
preserving the benefits of contracting through "keeping the deal together"' 155 correspond with protecting the substantial reliance interest of
a party on harm-avoidance grounds. Moreover, a consistent application
of the fairness norms will encourage contract formation. 56
The latter observation is illustrated in the context of long-term
agreements. Contracting parties' interests diverge on cessation most
often under such agreements because a party is likely to incur specialized reliance expenditures 15 7 and cessation rights are often unclear. For
example, a franchisee who expects the franchise to continue as long as it
performs satisfactorily, may make significant expenditures preparing for
long-term performance. 158 A termination "for any reason" clause may
cloud, however, the legitimacy of such expectations.1 59 In addition, as
the duration of a contract increases, predicting events and providing for
unusual circumstances becomes more difficult. 16° Accordingly, a longterm contract is more likely to contain gaps that require fair adjustment.
In such situations, the parties are likely to rely upon each other to compromise in filling those gaps. '6 ' The need to establish an overall harmonious relationship encourages each party to view its interests as
coinciding with the interests of its contracting counterpart. 162 In precisely these situations, courts must employ an approach that emphasizes
fairness and flexibility to encourage future contract formation. Parties
1966) (efficiency); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (termination of employee "not in the best interest of the economic system . 2).
153
For such a discussion, see Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a
Thoy of Common Lawjustifration, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1978).
154 See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Mineral
Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916); Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d
285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 69 N.J. 123,
351 A.2d 349 (1976); see also Summers, supra note 153, at 781 ("[J]udges commonly give rightness reasons as the primary grounds for the decision.').
155 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; inftd note 247 and accompanying text.
156 On the purpose of contract remedies, see supra note 146.
157 See Speidel, supra note 15, at 373-74. Professor Speidel offers the example of the longterm coal supplier who relies on the contract to finance the acquisition of coal reserves.
158 See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979); Clausen & Sons,
Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968); Straup v. Times Herald,
283 Pa. Super. 58, 423 A.2d 713 (1981); see also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683,
133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
159 See infia notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
160 Speidel, supra note 15, at 373.
161 See Anderson, supra note 77, at 746 (fiduciary wrongdoing involves "violation of trust
and a taking advantage of the victim's own cooperation").
162 See I. MACNEIL, supra note 68, at 30.
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may enter such arrangements, and in fact are encouraged to do so, be163
cause they know that contract law is responsive to their needs.
That cessation decisions based on fairness reasons typically produce
good social policy does not indicate, however, that the "real" reason for
such decisions is the furtherance of social goals. As discussed earlier,
courts generally tend to focus on fairness reasons apart from social policy concerns. Unless we presume that judges are in effect concocting an
164
elaborate smokescreen, we should take their opinions at face value.
II
CESSATION IN CONTEXT

In this section, I shall demonstrate how courts have applied the
principles and norms isolated in Part I to cessation disputes that traditionally have been viewed as demanding separate analytical approaches.
A.

Termination of Contracts of Indefinite Duration

1. Generalv
At common law, parties could terminate contracts of indefinite duration without cause upon giving of reasonable notice. 165 This rule was
grounded in the freedom-of-contract view that contracting parties
should not be liable beyond their express obligation. 66 Today, however, courts increasingly have restricted termination rights when the
contract is silent on duration or contains an ambiguous termination
clause, or in some cases, even when the parties have included a clear
termination clause. 167 Courts thereby protect the terminated party from
163 Most agreements today may be "relational." See I. MACNEIL, supra note 68, at 31;
Anderson, supra note 77, at 755 ("Transactions between merchants. . . characteristically involve a continuing relationship in which both parties depend on each other to perform in
good faith.").
164 See Summers, supra note 153, at 781.
165 See IA A. CORBIN, supra note 37, § 96, at 413; Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 473, 479;
Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1135; see, e.g., McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l
Corp., 480 F.2d 474, 479 (8th Cir. 1973); Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Rogers v. IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
Professor Macneil suggests that the termination-at-will rule was an attempt to turn "employment into a short-term commodity" in order to implement "discreteness" in transactions.
Macneil, supra note 65, at 863.
166 See Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 468.
167 See, e.g., Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975);
deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971); Tele-Controls, Inc. v.
Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.
Supp. 1108, 1121-23 (D. Mass. 1980); Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153
(1977); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978); Seegmiller v.
Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 (1968); John W. Lodge Dist. Co. v. Texaco
Inc., 245 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1978); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va.
1976).
For a catalogue of statutory protection, see STATE BUSINESS FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE

AND RELATIONSHIP LAW (CCH)

301-401 (1978); see also Automobile Dealers' Day In Court
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substantial harm and, in addition, often ensure the anticipated gains
from performance. 168
In the franchise termination area, 169 for example, some courts have
held that the termination of a franchise agreement of indefinite duration
is wrongful when the franchisee has not had a reasonable opportunity to
recoup its investment. 170 Recoupment may include not only reliance
expenditures, but also expected profits.' 71 Courts generally award such
profits only when they find an "implied" reasonable duration clause in
the contract. Often, however, courts base their inference of a reasonable
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976). But see U.C.C. § 2-309(2), (3) (1977) (contracts of indefinite duration may be terminated at any time). For a further listing of court decisions, see
Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 478-521; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only In GoodFaith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980); Weiss, State by
State: Chipping Away at Employment At-Will, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 18, 1982, at 21, col. 1; see also

Macneil, supra note 65, at 882-83 ("Thus, interstitially and gradually, increasingly tight limits
are being imposed on the general principle that parties may plan for unilateral termination of
contractual relations and that the courts will effectuate their planning.").
168
In the franchise area, for example, the right of termination generally is restricted
when a party has invested resources in the enterprise which may have little value "when
divorced from the franchise." Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 467, 479-83. Franchisees generally
are entitled to "recoup" their investment. Clausen & Sons Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing
Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968) (13 years may be reasonable to recoup investment); see also
Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 73-74, 423 A.2d 713, 720-21 (1981).
In 1967, when Professor Gellhorn wrote his insightful article on franchise termination,
courts afforded protection to terminated franchisees in only a minority of cases. Gellhorn,
supra note 21, at 480, 482-83; Hewitt, supra note 113. The more recent cases, with some
exceptions, suggest a trend toward greater protection. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co.,
609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736
(1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (1972), afd, 63 N.J. 402,
307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (express termination clause unconscionable); Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1137 n.112, 1138 n.116; Macneil, supra note 65, at 88182. But see Brattleboro Auto Sales Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 633 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.
1980); Corensweet v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
938 (1979); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980).
Employees are also protected increasingly against at-will termination. See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (public policy against
firing on basis of age); Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will: Do Exceptions Overwhelm The

Rule, 28 B.C.L. REv. 329, 358-61 (1982). The remedy for such employees is apparently expectancy. See, e.g., Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 908 (1956).
169 Franchising has become a major means of commerce in America. In 1977 gross sales
by franchisees were estimated to be over one-third of all retail sales. U.S. BUREAU OF DOMESTIC

COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY,

1975-77 (1977).

170 See supra note 168; see, e.g., Lockewill, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 547 F.2d 1024
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha
Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1973).
171
Some courts have limited the recovery to reliance loss. See, e.g., McGinnis Piano &
Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1973); Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v.
Hahn, Inc., 480 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1973). Others appear to permit a lost profits recovery. See,
e.g., Connelly v. Venus Food, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 2d 582, 345 P.2d 117 (1959); Des Moines
Blue Ribbon Distrib., Inc. v. Drewrys Ltd., 129 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1964); Bak-A-Lum Corp.
of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 69 N.J. 123, 351 A.2d 349 (1976); General Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 472, 117 S.E.2d 479, 489 (1960).
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duration clause on the desire to protect the franchisee's interests and not

on concrete evidence of the parties' intentions.1 72 These interests include expected profits that, but for the termination, would have resulted
from the franchisee's investment in "building the franchise." 1 73 Courts
also consider the terminating party's interests in termination-at-will
cases. Thus, if the terminated party's performance fails to satisfy a standard established in the trade or the contract, courts generally permit
74

termination. 1

Although courts have employed various constructs to restrict termination-at-will of contracts of indefinite duration,17 5 they have focused
considerable attention on the applicability of good faith and unconscionability.176 Accordingly, the discussion turns to an analysis of these
two constructs.
2.

Good Faith Tennination

The modem good faith performance obligation is codified in section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 177 and is increasingly invoked in case decisions outside of the Code. 178 One commentator has
172 See, e.g., Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Aloca Bldg. Prods. Inc., 69 N.J. 123, 351 A.2d
349 (1976); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479
(1960); Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923).
Employment termination cases also reflect the courts' desire to protect the terminated
employee. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
173 In McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474, 480 (8th Cir.
1973), however, the court emphasized that the investmdnt by the franchisee in "building the
franchise" was sufficient to submit the question of the duration of the franchise to the jury,
yet refused to award lost profits that would be the direct result of the investment. See also
supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the proper interests to be
protected, see supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Tele-Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967); Rogers v.
IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 37885, 294 A.2d 253, 264-68 (1972), aft, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
920 (1974); Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 (1968).
175 Se'e Murg & Scharman, supra note 168, at 355-72.
176 On good faith, see Murg & Scharman, supra note 168, at 361-67; see also Randolph v.
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1386 (6th Cir. 1975); deTreveille v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971); Tele-Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc.,
388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967); Pardee Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 320 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch.
1974); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920
(1974); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d
364 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, (W. Va. 1976). On unconscionability, see Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 490-93; Hewitt, supra note 113.
177 U.C.C. § 1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
178 For a discussion of the good faith requirement under the U.C.C., see generally Burton, GoodFaith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IoWA
L. REV. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Burton, GoodFaithPeiformance];Summers, supra note 39.
For a discussion of the common law duty of good faith performance, see Burton, Breach of
Contract andthe Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 3 70-72, 379-
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characterized the obligation as "resulting in an implied term . .. re-

quiring cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that
' 79
another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations."'
Notwithstanding open-ended contract language, if a promisor performs
in a manner that contradicts the promisee's reasonable expectations, the
performance is in bad faith.180 If, for example, a franchisee's reasonable
expectations are that its franchisor will not terminate a franchise except
for cause, a termination based on the franchisor's feigned dissatisfaction
would constitute bad faith.181
The good faith performance principle, which involves determining
the reasonable expectations of the parties, is merely an abstraction for
the contract interpretation process traced in Part 1.182 Courts engage in
the identical process of analysis whether they frame the issue in terms of
good faith performance or contract interpretation.18 3 In good faith performance cases, courts must consider contractual language and the surrounding circumstances, including an estimation of how reasonable
parties, bargaining fairly, would allocate risks1 84 to determine the parties' reasonable expectations. 185 This fairness inquiry expands the good
faith issue to include the norms described in Part 1.186 If the parties
clearly have not bargained about a particular risk, the courts cannot
1 87
rely on the expectations approach for deciding the good faith issue
and instead apply the fairness norms to resolve the issue. t88
Analysis of a concrete case will help to clarify the application of
good faith termination. Assume a franchise agreement permits termina80, 395-402 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Burton, Breach of Contract];Summers, The GeneralDuty
of Good Faith-ItsRecognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810 (1982).
179 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and CommercialReasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 669 (1963).
180 See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 178, at 386. The relevant inquiry, according
to Professor Burton, is whether the promisor exercised its discretion to "recapture a foregone
opportunity." Id at 391-92.
181 See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
183

See id

184

"'Reasonable' parties do not merely seek to accomplish rational objectives; they do so

constrained by norms of fairness and honesty." C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 73. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes "evasion of the spirit of the bargain" as one type of
bad faith. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment d (1979).
185 McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (D. Mass. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977).
186 See supra Part I(B); see also Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 877-79; Farnsworth, supra
note 179, at 671 ("Clearly good faith performance can be measured by an objective standard
based on the decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community, commercial or otherwise,
of which one is a member.").
187 See Burton, Good Faith Performance, supra note 178, at 29; accord Farnsworth, supra note
15, at 867.
188 See infra
notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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tion "for any reason."' 8 9 Suppose further that the franchisor, because of
animosity between the presidents of the two companies, t9 ° terminates
the relationship with the franchisee before the franchisee was able to
recoup its investment of over $1.5 million. 9 1 Finally, suppose that the
franchisee's performance satisfied all objective criteria for reasonable
performance.192 A termination that belies the reasonable expectations
of the franchisee would constitute bad faith. Because the termination
"for any reason" clause is probative of those expectations, a court must
grapple with the clause in reaching its decision. The parties may have
intended the word "reason" to mean a performance related reason and,
therefore, termination would be permitted only for "cause."' 93 On the
other hand, the parties may have intended the "for any reason" language to encompass even ill will terminations. 194 Still another possibil189 See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir.
1979). See generally Gellhorn, supra note 21.
190 The claim that termination was based on ill will is often made. See Gellhorn, supra
note 21, at 467.
191
These are the essential facts of Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1979). Corenswet was the exclusive distributor of certain home appliances manufactured by Amana. The agreement between Corenswet and Amana contained a termination clause that permitted termination by either party "'at any time for any reason' " on ten
days' notice. Id at 132. Corenswet had spent over $1.5 million developing the market for
Amana products within its territory and had apparently lost money for over five years and
still showed an overall loss. Brief for Appellant at 28, Corenswet, 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979).
The court found that Corenswet had, in fact, "developed an important new market" for
Amana products. Id
192 In Corenswet, for example, the evidence suggested that Amana representatives were
satisfied with Corenswet's performance: "Over the seven and one-half-year period, Amana
representatives repeatedly praised Corenswet for its performance." 594 F.2d at 132.
193 The district court in Corenswet concluded that Amana had acted arbitrarily in deciding to terminate Corenswet. The court based its finding on "ample evidence in the record"
supporting the conclusion that the real reason Amana sought to terminate Corenswet's distributorship was the "animosity" Amana's president felt toward the president of Corenswet's
parent corporation. Id at 133. The court enjoined Amana from terminating, construed the
termination " 'for any reason' "clause in the agreement to mean "'for some reason, not for no
reason,'" and held alternatively that Amana's termination was in bad faith in violation of
U.C.C. § 2-103. Id
In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 NJ. Super. 357, 373-74, 294 A.2d 253, 262 (1972),
afd, 63 NJ. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) the court stated:
"Surely no person would make the kind of investment in money, time and effort as did Marinello without the reasonable expectation that if he substantially performed his obligations to
Shell, the latter would in turn continue to renew his lease and dealership."
194 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in Corenswet stating that the correct construction of the phrase" 'for any reason' "was" 'for any reason that the actor [Amana] deems
sufficient.'" Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 135. In addition, even if a reason was required, the court
found that Amana's desire to give the distributorship to another company with whom it was
negotiating provided such a reason. Id The court held that the understanding of both parties that Amana's usual practice was not to terminate arbitrarily conflicted with the express
term permitting arbitrary termination that would control under U.C.C. § 1-205. The court
found support for its conclusion in U.C.C. § 2-309(2), which states that a contract indefinite
in duration "may be terminated at any time by either party." 594 F.2d at 137. Continuing
its attack on the good faith argument of Corenswet, the court asserted that terminations without cause "almost always" will constitute bad faith and that focusing on the state of mind of
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ity is that the parties did not even consider the question of termination
for ill will. 195

Evidence such as admissions and admissible oral representations regarding the meaning of the language or definitional language in the
contract may create a strong inference about the parties' intentions.
Representations to the franchisee about the duration of other franchises
may also create some weaker inferences as to the franchisee's expectations concerning duration under the "for any reason" clause.196 In the
absence of relative certainty, a court, in inferring the intentions of the
parties, may also consider whether reasonable parties bargaining fairly
would agree to a relationship requiring immense investment by the franchisee, yet subject to termination by the franchisor without cause and
without a right to recoup either reliance expenditures or profits. If parties bargaining fairly would not make such an agreement, the termination would ordinarily be in bad faith.
Even in the absence of sufficient probative evidence of the parties'
intentions, the court may adhere to the fiction that the parties' intentions control the good faith determination and, consequently, the right
of termination. Despite the court's professed adherence to the parties'
intent, however, the fairness norms described in this article often appear
to constitute the underlying basis for the decisions. 97 Under the good
the terminating party will result in the abolition of unrestricted termination clauses. Id at
138.
195 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 466 (in drafting franchise agreements, the parties
"often cover the problem of termination only cursorily . ..'
196 The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Corenswet is troubling because the evidence consisting of Amana's previous treatment of Corenswet and other distributors and of Amana's
representations made to Corenswet suggested that Corenswet reasonably expected its relationship with Amana to be a "lasting one" as long as it performed satisfactorily. 594 F.2d at
132. The court's reliance on U.C.C. § 1-205, which asserts that express language "controls"
course of dealing and trade usage evidence, depends on the supposition that the "for any
reason" clause unambiguously allocated the risk of ill will termination to Corenswet. As the
district court realized, however, the language could also be interpreted to permit termination
for any "good faith" reason. See, e.g., Saarela v. Hoglund, 198 Ill. App. 485, 487-88 (1916);
Dubois v. Gentry, 182 Tenn. 103, 108-09, 184 S.W.2d 369, 371 (1945).
Even if the termination clause on its face permitted an ill will termination, the court
ignored common law and Code precedent and numerous commentaries that repudiate the
"plain meaning" approach. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 492-95; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(1) and comment b (1979). These authorities reason
that extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine whether the parties intended to adopt
a dictionary meaning of the contract language. If the Fifth Circuit had considered extrinsic
evidence in this manner, it might have seen that the parties did not intend to adopt a meaning
of the "for any reason" termination clause that would allow Amana to terminate in order to
seek revenge.
In addition, because U.C.C. § 1-203 supplements U.C.C. Article 2 with the obligation of
good faith, § 2-309(2) should be read to permit termination at any time in goodfaith. See
Tele-Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., 388 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1967). Any other construction
contradicts the central purpose and policy of the Code requiring good faith and fair dealing
in commercial transactions and belies the express language of § 1-203.
197
Courts, for example, may base the termination decision on the "unfairness" of termi-
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faith fairness approach, the court must balance the franchisee's reliance
losses and unrealized expected gains against the franchisor's right to rid
itself of a franchisee that is performing satisfactorily but that it does not
like.' 98
3.

Unconscionabiliy

The application of unconscionability or good faith performance to
the termination of contracts of indefinite duration has been the subject
of some debate.199 Problems involving harsh express termination clauses
test the limits of freedom of contract and thereby fall, as we have
seen, 200 within the province of unconscionability. Conversely, agreements silent on duration command a good faith performance analysis
because courts must investigate the parties' intentions. But what of
those agreements that contain termination clauses that are ambiguous?

Because of the similarity of analysis under each approach in such cases,
the issue of which doctrine to apply is less significant.
Suppose, for example, that the parties specifically intended the ambiguous "for any reason" clause in the franchise termination problem to
permit termination for ill will. Such a termination will not be countenanced if the clause is unconscionable. 20 ' Similar to good faith performnating a franchisee in light of its large reliance expenditures. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,
120 N.J. Super. 357, 373, 294 A.2d 253, 262 (1972), af 'd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); see also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649
F.2d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1981); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877,
438 N.E.2d 351 (1982). But see Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 132.
198 In Corenswet, for example, the reliance interest of Corenswet was well documented.
594 F.2d at 132. See also McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474,
477 (8th Cir. 1973); deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971). In
addition, even though Corenswet had recouped part of its investment, the court should not
have ignored the potential for future return on its long-term investment in considering the
harm to Corenswet from termination. See, e.g., Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distrib., Inc. v.
Drewrys, Ltd., 129 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Iowa 1974) (citing cases). On the other side, the evidence suggested that Corenswet was an excellent franchisee and Amana would not suffer
harm by the continuation of the relationship. The reasonableness of Amana's conduct is also
subject to criticism. Apparently Amana continued to negotiate with Corenswet even though
it intended to terminate, and, in fact, was actively negotiating with another distributor to
take Corenswet's place. Because of Amana's unfair tactics, the material harm to Corenswet
on termination, and the profitability of the agreement to Amana, the decision of the Fifth
Circuit in favor of Amana seems incorrect.
Unallocated termination risks arise in many different contexts. For an example of an
employment contract termination, see McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp.
1108, 1118 (D. Mass. 1980) (contract held to contain implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing breached by termination on basis of age).
199 Gellhorn, for example, favors unconscionability for regulating franchise termination,
Gellhorn, supra note 21, whereas Hewitt favors good faith, Hewitt, supra note 113. See also
Goetz & Scott, supra note 58, at 1137-40.
200 See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
201 See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1976); see also Shell Oil
Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cerl. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); supra
notes 25-37 and accompanying text.

1983]

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

ance, the extent of the franchisee's reliance losses and expected gains are
elements of unconscionability because they indicate whether the termination clause destroyed the essence of the franchisee's deal. 20 2 The reliance element requires investigation of the parties' positions at the time
of contract breakdown, a determination that courts do not generally recognize as a function of unconscionability. 20 3 The actual reliance loss is
nevertheless significant in determining unconscionability because the
proponent of unconscionability will assert that the parties intended the
termination clause at the time of contracting to cover the particular situation 20 4 (i.e., the parties "contemplated" that the franchisor could terminate for ill will before the franchisee recouped a long-term
investment).
In addition to actual reliance losses and expected gains, courts
would investigate the need for a broad termination right in both good
faith termination and unconscionability cases. In the good faith termination context, the courts would focus on the immediate impact of denying to the franchisor a right of termination for ill will, whereas in the
unconscionability realm the courts' focus would include whether, on a
more general level, the broad termination right fosters a legitimate need
of the franchisor. In either case, however, courts would balance the justification for the termination right against the franchisee's reliance
losses.

20 5

Under either good faith or unconscionability analysis, the court
would also inquire into the status or bargaining position of the franchisee. 20 6 In unconscionability cases, the franchisee's bargaining position is probative of whether the franchisee truly assented to the suspect
termination clause. In good faith inquiries, the bargaining position of
the franchisee would be of some relevance to the question of how the
parties allocated risks in the absence of clarity in the contract.
The court's decision whether to apply good faith performance or
unconscionability to the franchise termination problem will depend on
whether it finds the "for any reason" termination clause to be suffi202

Professor Gellhorn proposed the following test for unconscionability:

[W]hether the harm which will or is likely to result to the terminatedparty from enforcing the terminationprovisionis proportionalto the harm which will or is likely to result to
the terminatingpart ifthe provision is not enforced Again, equivalence of harm is
not the test; only disproportionateharm is censured. This test would be applied
in light of the facts known at the time of actual or proposed termination.
Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 517-18 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
203 ' See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(l) (1977).
204 See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionabilitv, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 802-03 (1969).
205 See Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 318 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1377-78 (1980) (no
unconscionability or bad faith because no "potential" for loss of investment existed;
franchisor was obligated to repurchase inventory and franchisee failed to show that termination provision was "not reasonably related to business needs").
206 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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ciently broad to include termination for spiteful reasons. If the provi-

sion is sufficiently broad, unconscionability is the proper approach. If
not, the question becomes one of good faith performance. Ultimately,
because the criteria for determining good faith performance and unconscionability are so similar in cases involving ambiguous termination
clauses, 20 7 courts should be concerned less with which principle to apply
and instead direct their judicial energies toward the task of applying the
fairness norms.
B.

Cessation on the Basis of Excuse:
Impracticability, and Frustration

Mistake, Impossibility,

Courts may excuse parties from performance because of unexpected difficulties that make performance unfairly onerous or impossible. 20 8 Relief in the event of these unexpected circumstances is based on
the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration doctrines. 20 9 In addition, a party may also be excused when the agreement was based on a
mutually held and materially erroneous view of existing facts. 210 Courts
207

f

Hewitt, supra note 113, at 235 (expressing desire for unified consistent application

of criteria underlying the two doctrines).
Under the U.C.C. differences exist in the application of unconscionability and good faith
performance because of differences in form. For example, good faith is defined in the Code.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b) (1977). Unconscionability, on the other hand, is undefined. See U.C.C. § 2-302. In addition, good faith is cited in many Article 2 provisions,
whereas unconscionability is found in only three provisions. The frequency of reference to
good faith in Article 2 may raise the negative inference that the concept does not supplement
sections in which it is not specifically mentioned, whereas unconscionability overrides all sections. See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d at 138.
A judge makes a finding of unconscionability under U.C.C. § 2-302, whereas questions of
honesty and reasonableness in good faith performance are reserved for the factfinder. See, e.g.,
Banner Iron Works, Inc. v. Amax Zinc Co., 621 F.2d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 1980) (good faith issue
is jury question). But see Tipton v. Woodbury, 616 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1980) (good faith determination made by judge). Because unconscionability is a question of law, it more closely
resembles a general equitable principle than does good faith performance.
208 See, e.g., in re M & M Transp. Co., 13 Bankr. 861, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (frustration);
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (impracticability), rev'don other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec.
Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (impossibility), modiAkd on other grounds, 523 P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1974); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App.) (no excuse for impracticability), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977); see also in/fa note 215.
209 See generally Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 85-86; infia notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
210 See, e:g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440,
457-58 (E.D. Va. 1981) (dictum); Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not clearly distinguish mistake and the other
excuse doctrines on the basis of existing fact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
introductory note to ch. 11 (1979); seealso Aluminum Co. ofAm. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.
Supp. 53, 61-63 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
Generally when a party receiving a bid has not yet relied, the bidding party who has
acted reasonably may be relieved of the burden of a unilateral mistake as well. See, e.g., Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 701, 235 P.2d 7, 10-11 (1951);
Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564 (1907); Harry Harris, Inc. v. Quality Constr.
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base relief from such an agreement on the general doctrine of mistake.2 11
Under all of these doctrines, courts afford relief when the parties did not
allocate the risk of the actual, but unknown, or supervening circumstances; freedom of contract does not constrain the courts in such
situations.
In contrast to the problem of termination-at-will, the availability of
212
relief from performance on excuse grounds has gradually increased.
Early cases excused performance only on the basis of objective impossibility where the parties were literally incapable of performance due to
circumstances that were "unforeseeable" at the time of contract formation.2 13 Today, although courts still employ impracticability rather
sparingly, 2 14 a finding of impracticability requires only that performance has become extremely onerous due to the occurrence of an unforeseeable, or in some cases, an unexpected contingency. 2 15 In addition,
frustration requires only that the terminating party's expected consider2 16
ation has lost much of its value due to an unanticipated event.
In analyzing excuse doctrine cases, courts first interpret the contract and surrounding circumstances to determine whether parties have
allocated the risk of a contingency. If the parties have allocated the risk
Co., 593 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); James T. Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Arlington
Indep. School Dist., 160 Tex. 617, 335 S.W.2d 371 (1960). See also J. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY
ON CONTRACTS § 129, at 267 n.6 (1974) (citing Aemper).
211 See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 60-70 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (discussing doctrine of unilateral and mutual mistake in light of Professor Corbin's
analysis and Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
212

See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 683 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-

TRACTS introductory note to ch. 11 (1979); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980); U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
213 See, e.g., Mahaska County State Bank v. Brown, 159 Iowa 577, 585, 141 N.W. 459,462
(1913); 18 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1963 (3d ed. 1978)
(impracticability of performance was not originally recognized as an excuse).
214 Despite the liberalization of a party's right to discharge on excuse grounds, evidenced
by U.C.C. § 2-615, many courts have applied the section restrictively. See, e.g., Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978). See generally J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 132-33 (2d ed. 1980). Courts may be reading
§ 2-615 restrictively because many of the litigated cases involve long-term contracts, which
engender substantial reliance by both parties. Thus, although the courts apparently focus on
the plight of the party seeking discharge, they also consider the harmful effect of discharge on
the party seeking enforcement. See infra notes 221-37 and accompanying text. When such
harm is substantial, perhaps the court should impose a price adjustment. See Aluminum Co.
of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (Essex needed long-term
supply of aluminum to assure continued operation of its expensive machinery); Speidel, supra
note 15; infra notes 234-37.
215 Some courts require the event causing the additional expense to be unforeseeable. See,
e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438, 441-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
Other cases, however, recognize that foreseeability does not necessarily prove a contingency's
allocation. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 76 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
216 In re M & M Transp. Co., 13 Bankr. 861,869 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Krell v. Henry, [1903]
2 K.B. 740, 746 (C.A.).
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to the promisor, an excuse approach is not available and unconscionability or related grounds would afford the only possible relief to the
promisor. If the parties have failed to allocate the risk then the courts
must fill the gap. 21 7 When the contract and surrounding circumstances
are unclear, courts may isolate several factors in identifying the parties'
allocation of the risk of contingencies. As we have seen, these factors
may be unreliable in many cases.2 18 A helpful generalization in predicting a court's finding on the parties' risk allocation or in predicting how a
court will allocate the risk in gap situations is that when losses to the
promisor would be moderate courts will not excuse performance, 21 9 but
when losses would be extreme and the promisor has acted reasonably
22 0
courts will excuse performance.
Courts do not ignore the interests of the party seeking enforcement

in the excuse cases. In ascertaining the parties' intentions on the allocation of the risk of a particular event, courts may refer to the expected
217 See cases cited infra notes 219-20; see also Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 86 ("In
every discharge case the basic problem is the same: to decide who should bear the loss resulting from an event that has rendered performance by one party uneconomical.").
218 See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
219 See American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.
1972) (31.5% increase); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (14% increase); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (correction cost not prohibitive); see also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.,
517 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("no showing" that Westinghouse lost money on "entire undertaking"); In re M & M Transp. Co., 13 Bankr. 861, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (no finding
of frustration, little harm to party urging its application). Courts have decided some impracticability cases against energy suppliers because the suppliers took advantage ofmarket conditions to increase overall profits even though the particular contract was unprofitable.
Generally, these courts have found that the increased costs with respect to performing the
contract at issue resulted from the supplier's own marketing decisions. E.g., Iowa Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
220 See Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, modfldon other ground, 523
P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1974) (93% increase); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289,
293, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916) (tenfold increase); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499
F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) ($60 to S75 million out-of-pocket loss; court imposed price adjustment). Courts often refer to the senselessness of insisting on performance. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dicta); In re M & M
Transp. Co., 13 Bankr. 861, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing J. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 202 (1974)); see also Maple Farms Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1085,
352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 790 (1974) ("There is no precise point, though such could conceivab y be reached,
at which an increase in price of raw goods above the norm would be so disproportionate to
the risk assumed as to amount to 'impracticality' [sic] in a commercial sense.") (emphasis
added); Joskow, supra note 130, at 160 ("In essence the impracticability doctrine says that
contracts will be enforced. . . unless it really hurts. Other things being equal, the seller bears
all of the risk unless performance is extremely burdensome, in which case the buyer bears all
the risk."); Note, supra note 62, at 575, 589.
U.C.C. § 2-615(1), although confusingly worded, adopts an impracticability approach
similar to that traced in this article. See generally Speidel, supra note 56, at 257-71. Professor
Speidel urges that impracticability hinges on "the degree to which performance has been
made different, rather than upon the degree of financial hardship suffered." Id at 266. He
recognizes, however, that courts have focused on the extent of financial loss. Id at 267.
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gains of the party seeking enforcement. 22 1 Because the very purpose of a
contract is to ensure performance under unknown conditions, a court
may reason that the parties must have intended performance to occur
under the particular circumstances. 22 2 Even when courts abandon the
intentions approach, they continue. to consider the interests of the party
seeking performance. For example, courts have applied section 2-615 of
the Uniform Commercial Code on impracticability parsimoniously because most of the cases involve long-term contracts that engender substantial reliance and expectations on the part of both parties. 223 Thus,
although courts often expressly focus on the plight of the party seeking a
discharge, they also consider, without always acknowledging, the effect
224
of discharge on the other party.
In cases involving large increases in the cost of performance, such as
the oil supply case discussed in Part 1,225 a discharge will affect the party
seeking enforcement in two ways. First, a discharge will assure that the
party seeking performance will not enjoy the balance sheet gain of a
large market-price contract-price differential. In this respect a court
must confront the problem of whether the party seeking enforcement
has legitimate expectations of performance. 226 The party seeking enforcement may not have contracted for performance under the exigent
circumstances and thus, it may not be entitled to the gains. 227 On the
other hand, the party seeking cessation may not be entitled to a discharge under the circumstances. All other things being equal, in choosing between compelling the promisor to suffer a material loss, or
permitting a discharge that denies a large gain to the promisee, courts
would presumably lean towards the latter; courts appear to treat out-ofpocket losses as more real and more deserving of relief than the loss of
income. 228 In an uncertain situation, this approach would leave the
221 E.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
222 E.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(price increases were "a fact of life for the future") (quoting one party's contract negotiator);
set also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 214; see also Speidel, supra note 15, at 373.
Conversely, Professor Gellhorn suggests that in franchise termination cases courts may
not have applied unconscionability very often because "the losses to the terminated party
often have not seemed severe, especially when compared to the potential losses to the manufacturer, if the termination provision were not enforced." Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 517.
224 For cases expressly considering the effect of a discharge on the party asserting enforceability, see, for example In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F.
Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
Pa. 1980); see also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 381-82 (especially discussion of Nicol v.
Fitch, 115 Mich. 15, 72 N.W. 988 (1897), therein).
225 See supra notes 45-46, 49-50, 56 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 56.
228 See, e.g., C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977);
Caplan v. Roberts, 506 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1974).
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parties in the status quo ante. 229
Second, the party seeking enforcement of a long-term supply contract may have incurred large reliance expenses or may have foregone
other profitable opportunities. 230 That party should recoup its costs incurred in preparing for performance or the value of foregone opportunities if they are not too remote. When these interests are substantial,
discharge may be inappropriate. Because performance by the party
seeking discharge may ultimately lead to forfeiture, however, the appropriate remedy may be sharing the losses, such as a discharge, but only
after recoupment of reliance expenditures. Courts confronted with this
problem have not always been so flexible. Instead, upon granting a discharge, many have required only that each party return the benefit conferred by the other party. 23 ' In a few cases, however, "benefit
conferred" has included reliance expenditures that do not technically
benefit the other party.2 32 When courts can apportion a contract, the
party seeking enforcement prior to the occurrence of the unallocated
233
contingency has also recovered expectancy damages.
Even when courts do not apply an excuse doctrine they may still
restrict a party's right to insist on a promised performance out of concern for the potential harm to the other party. Professor Speidel has
recently discussed the problem of a party's refusal to negotiate a modification when an unanticipated event has made performance of a longterm supply contract unfairly costly. 234 Even when a party seeking discharge would be unsuccessful, Professor Speidel suggests that in some
situations courts should restrict the right to "hold" that party to the
contract after an unanticipated event.23 5 He recommends a judicially
imposed price adjustment when the "advantaged" party refuses to accept "an equitable adjustment proposed in good faith. ' 23 6 Speideljustifies the adjustment on the theory that the parties are obligated to share
229 The response is similar to that of courts when faced with a request for a mandatory
injunction in which the moving party cannot demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success
on the merits. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 110 (1973).
230 Professor Speidel posits the example of an electric utility that depends on a supplier
for a specified grade of coal for a new generator. Speidel, supra note 15, at 373. *
231

See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 13-17 (2d ed. 1977);

Farnsworth, supra note 150, at 381.
232 See genera4lv RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158, 272 (1979) (permitting
relying party recovery for reliance loss regardless of whether it benefits other party); Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 2, at 380-81; Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 37, 39 (1981).
233 See Perillo, supra note 232.
234 See Speidel, supbra note 15, at 370 ("[Tlhe question addressed is when, if ever, will the
advantaged party's refusal to consent to a price term adjustment offered by the disadvantaged party justify a court-imposed adjustment?").
235
236

Id.

Id at 418 ("[I]ntervention is justified only as a remedy for the advantaged party's
improper refusal to accept an equitable adjustment proposed in good faith.').
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unexpected gains and losses and to cooperate during the course of the
contract.2 37 Because Professor Speidel's approach would apply to situations in which excuse doctrines are inapplicable, it would increase the
protection afforded a dependent party and, concomitantly would decrease the advantaged party's right to insist on the original performance.
Accordingly, his resolution is consistent with the modern approach to
cessation problems identified herein.
C.

Termination Due to Failure of an Express Condition or
Material Breach

Contracting parties may expressly condition one performance on
another promised performance. For example, the completion of the
construction of a house may be an express condition precedent to a
landowner's obligation to pay for the house. When a party fails to perform such a promissory condition precedent, the injured party is released from its obligation to perform and may recover damages.
Enforcement of the promissory condition precedent, however, may
harm the breaching party far more than nonenforcement would harm
the injured party. The contractor, for example, may have put all the
bricks in place but one. Judicial doctrines such as divisibility, waiver,
restitution-in-behalf-of-a-party-in-default, forfeiture, and unconscionability mitigate the potential unfairness of termination by restricting the
right of the injured party to avoid the bargain.2 38
237 Professor Speidel cautions that a price adjustment remedy should not be awarded
"without examining the quality of the ex post bargaining." Id at 412. At least one court has
imposed an "equitable" price adjustment in a long-term supply contract. See Aluminum Co.
of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (discussed in Speidel,supra note
15); see aso U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 6 (1977) (requiring courts to make adjustments in light
of [the provision's] purposes, and the general policy. . . to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith").
The problem of when courts should require a modification on fairness grounds presents
the converse of the problem of when courts should bar enforcement of a modification made in
bad faith. Nevertheless, each problem involves avoiding material loss to the disadvantaged
party and restricting the rights of the other party. A court imposed modification limits the
right to insist on performance. According to Professor Speidel, courts should base such a
modification on an evaluation of the unallocated losses suffered and the bargaining tactics of
the party seeking modification. Id at 412. In deciding whether to enforce a party-imposed
modification, courts evaluate the materiality of the suggested modification, the bargaining
tactics of the party seeking a modification, and the availability of alternative choices to the
other party. Between these extremes, each party has the right to insist on performance or to
agree voluntarily to modify the agreement.
238 See, e.g., Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Knight, 70 Cal. 2d 327, 450 P.2d 42 (1969)
(forfeiture); Margolin v. Franklin, 132 Ill. App. 2d 527, 270 N.E.2d 140 (1971) (waiver);
Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) (restitution); supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text
(unconscionability); see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 570-71 ("disproportionate forfeiture"); Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 926 (1942)
(prevention of forfeitures). These doctrines also temper the right of a party to cease performance after the failure of a pure condition precedent, i.e., the failure of a condition precedent
not in the control of the other party.
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When the parties have failed to expressly state the promissory conditions precedent, the court must evaluate contractual language and the
surrounding circumstances to determine whether such conditions exist.
As with the other areas of performance cessation, sometimes this evidence will strongly suggest the actual intentions of the parties as to what
types of breach permit the injured party to terminate. Often, however,
the evidence will be less helpful.
Inquiry into the existence of implied promissory conditions entails a
determination of whether the injured party will receive substantially
what it bargained for. If the court determines it will receive its bargain,
then the injured party must perform; its own failure to perform would
constitute a material breach of the contract. If not, then the breach is
material, the injured party's duty to perform is discharged and damages
may be recovered. 239 Factors that courts enumerate in determining materiality of the breach reflect the comparative equities approach described in Part I of this article. These factors include the extent to
which the injured party can be made whole under the contract (i.e.,
whether the party can avoid forfeiture) and the extent of harm to the
breaching party on termination measured primarily by reliance
losses. 24° Although this inquiry focuses upon the reliance rather than
the expectation interest of the breaching party, if the court determines
that the injured party's termination was wrongful, the proper remedy is
expectancy damages. 24 1 Thus, if a landowner wrongfully ceases performance after an "immaterial" breach by the contractor, the contractor will be entitled to an expectancy recovery, even if the court based its
determination of immateriality primarily on the contractor's reliance
expenditures. Any other result in this context would challenge the foundation of expectancy damages by limiting the liability of a party who
242
wrongfully terminates a contract to reliance losses only.
Contract law increasingly has restricted the right of cessation for
breach because a discharge of the injured party may result in severe
harm to the breaching party. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
for example, restricts the right to cease performance on material breach
grounds by distinguishing between material breaches that permit suspension of performance, and material breaches that permit termina239

240

§ 241 (1979).
See id § 241 and especially comment d; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 552

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

(preference against forfeiture); Patterson, supra note 238, at 927 (foonote omitted):

[Tihe process of determining when a party's breach is sufficiently "material"
to justify the other in ceasing performance is influenced by the extent to
which the former has committed himself as a result of the contract, even
though his commitment has not enriched the other party. Whether one calls
this "hardship" or "forfeiture," the principle is clear.
241 See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at 840 & n.8; cf U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977) (remedies to be liberally administered).
242 See supra note 146.
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tion.2 4 3 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the right to cure and to
demand adequate assurances of performance may help to "keep the deal
together."' 244 The doctrines of divisibility and restitution-in-behalf-of-aparty-in-default restrict the right of injured parties to avoid deals after
failure of implied as well as express conditions. 245 If a breaching party
offers to perform after a material breach, courts deny the injured party
the right to refuse to accede to the new offer and to avoid dealing with
the breaching party in some situations. For example, when a breaching
party offers to cure where there is little risk of subsequent breach the

courts may find that a failure to accept the offer of cure is a failure to
minimize damages. 246 By barring complete termination, each of these
approaches avoids severe harm to the breaching party and concomitantly, benefits society by providing greater assurance of contract
performance.
243

244

24 7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1979).
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-508 (1977) (cure by seller of improper tender or delivery; replace-

ment); id. § 2-609 (right to adequate assurance of performance). See generally Hillman, supra
note 122.
245 See, e.g., Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-99
(D. Colo. 1976); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
246 Hillman, supra note 122.
247 Contract law's approach to liquidated damages provisions also evidences the law's
reluctance to impose a forfeiture on the breaching party. Such provisions are enforceable
only when actual damages were difficult to determine at the time of contract formation and
when the stipulated amount is a reasonable estimate of the anticipated loss. Seegeneraly Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 511-12 (discussing limitations on contract termination rights in
franchise cancellation). But see U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1977) ("Damages for breach . . . may be
liquidated. . . but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach ... ") (emphasis added).
Another cessation concept involves termination upon failure of the parties to satisfy a
formality. A party may terminate a contract made unenforceable by the failure of the parties
to satisfy a requisite such as clarity, mutuality of obligation, or a writing. See, e.g., Transamerica Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Union Bank, 426 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1970) (clarity); Tidmore
v. Office of Gov't Dep't of Indus. Dev., 636 P.2d 386, 392 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (mutuality);
Wamser v. Bamberger, 101 Wis. 2d 637, 643-45, 305 N:W.2d 158, 160-62 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981) (statute of frauds). Courts avoid termination on these grounds, however, when one of
the parties will suffer substantial harm. In evaluating whether contract language is sufficient
to avoid a claim of ambiguity, failure of mutuality, or illusoriness, courts may be motivated to
"save" a contract on the basis of substantial reliance by one of the parties. Such reliance
demonstrates the serious intent of the parties to contract, which a court may refuse to defeat
on the basis of a technicality. Cf Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills Ltd., 254 N.Y.
179, 172 N.E. 462 (1930) (letters from one merchant to another, constituting sales contract,
are read as businessmen would read them, and will only as a last resort be thrown out as
meaningless.); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (implied
term to use reasonable efforts to market goods prevented contract invalidation for lack of
mutuality).
If the court cannot rehabilitate contractual language, it may apply the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel to protect parties who have reasonably relied on such abortive
contracts. Instead of bargain, detrimental reliance in the form of expenditures or lost opportunities, see, e.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623-26, 220 P.2d 737, 739-41 (1950)
(en bane), controls at least limited enforcement of these arrangements. See Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 2, at 394-95; Henderson, PromissogEstoppel and TraditionalContract Doctrine, 78 YALE
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CONCLUSION

This examination of cessation cases suggests that many areas of
contract doctrine heretofore considered as separate or distinct are analytically very similar. Whether it be termination of a contract of indefinite duration, termination after breach, or cessation on excuse grounds,
courts first examine contractual language and surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the parties have assigned the right of cessation. If the agreement fails to clearly demonstrate the parties' intentions
or is suspect under an unconscionability or related inquiry, courts typically weigh potential gains and losses from cessation and evaluate the
reasonableness of the parties' conduct to ensure a fair result. Recognizing the true basis for court decisions in cessation cases clarifies various
issues. The fairness analysis illuminates, for example, the relationship of
good faith and unconscionability to the problem of termination-at-will,
the relationships of various excuse doctrines such as mistake, impracticability, and frustration to each other, the reluctance of courts to apply
modern commercial impracticability, and the right of cessation after a
"material" breach.
The cessation approach establishes in contracting parties the duty
to consider the effect of performance related decisions on their contracting counterparts. The quasi-fiduciary responsibility between contracting parties enlarges the duty of each party to refrain from conduct
similar to that recognized as actionable on tort grounds. 248 For example, although a person generally has no duty to rescue a stranger, 249
once he has begun his attempt he has a duty to complete it in a reasonable fashion. 250 This principle is similar to the developing principle
traced.in this article that once a contractual relation has begun, a party
has a duty to perform in a manner calculated, at least in part, to "pro25 1
tect" the other party.
The balancing approach traced provides ample evidence of the emLJ.343, 364 (1969). Much of the litigation in this area deals with promises unenforceable
under the statute of frauds. E.g., Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp.
687, 696-97 (W.D. Wis. 1974), afd,527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976) (and cases cited therein);
Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979). When reliance is "justifiable and serious" courts discount the necessity of demonstrating a clear promise. Henderson, supra, at 364. Promissory estoppel embodies nothing more than a basic test of fairness. Id.
at 383.
248 Courts have found that contracting parties must avoid conduct that constitutes an
independent tort. For example, an employer may be liable in tort for a retaliatory termination of an employee. See Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.: Tort Action For Retahato7,Discharge
Upon Filing Wforkmen'r Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 659, 675-77 (1979);
Note, supra note 167, at 1818 n.13.
249 But see Weinrib, The Case for a Duly to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
250 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 340-43 (4th ed. 1971).
251 The harm-avoidance principle demonstrates that obligations arising from contractual
relations are significantly the product of interests independent of the parties' promises. See G.
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 68, 87-88 (1974); I. MACNEIL, supra note 68, at 58;
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phasis modern courts place on equity and flexibility. 252 The approach

can be criticized because of the sacrifice of certainty, 253 which may increase costs of contracting and litigation. 254 Adherence to fairness and
flexibility, however, is in itself a social good because it encourages contract-making. When contracting parties believe that contract rules and
principles are not arbitrary they may be more willing to enter contractual relationships; an approach free from inequities in gap filling and
255
interpretation perpetuates that belief.

Fried, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1858, 1868 (1980); see also supra notes 106-24 and
accompanying text.
252
In a recent essay, Professor Atiyah discussed the conflicting goals ofjudicial decisionmaking: to "encourage or discourage" behavior in the future and to "do justice" in the particular case. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of theJudicialProcess
and the Law, 65 IoWA L. REV. 1249, 1250, 1255 (1980). Atiyah characterizes the tension
between these goals as between "principles and pragmatism." Id at 1250. Concerned that
"pragmatic" decisions may confuse the law, he concludes that the recent trend in judicial
decisions towards pragmatism may raise questions about the legitimacy of the judicial role in
our legal system.
253 Id at 1259.
254 Joskow, supra note 130, at 175-76. Posner and Rosenfeld argue that specific rules on
discharge "enhance the efficiency of the contract process," and to the extent that they allocate
risks efficiently they eliminate the need for contracting parties to bargain with respect to those
risks. Posner & Rosenfeld, supra note 57, at 114. On the uncertainty of rules, see Hillman
supra note 6, at 15-16 & n.84 and Young, supra note 102, at 28-29.
255 See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 65-66, 76 (W.D. Pa.
1980) ("Courts must decide the point at which the community's interest in predictable contract enforcement shall yield to the fact that enforcement of a particular contract would be
commercially senseless and unjust."); Anderson, supra note 77, at 742; Speidel, supra note 15,
at 373-75, 402.

